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Abstract
We survey the empirical literature on corporate financial restructuring, including breakup trans-
actions (divestitures, spin-offs, equity carveouts, tracking stocks), leveraged recapitalizations,
and leveraged buyouts (LBOs). For each transaction type, we survey techniques, deal financ-
ing, transaction volume, valuation effects and potential sources of restructuring gains. Many
breakup transactions are a response to excessive conglomeration and reverse costly diversifica-
tion discounts. The empirical evidence shows that the typical restructuring creates substantial
value for shareholders. The value-drivers include elimination of costly cross-subsidizations char-
acterizing internal capital markets, reduction in financing costs for subsidiaries through asset
securitization and increased divisional transparency, improved (and more focused) investment
programs, reduction in agency costs of free cash flow, implementation of executive compen-
sation schemes with greater pay-performance sensitivity, and increased monitoring by lenders
and LBO sponsors. Buyouts after the turn of the century created value similar to LBOs of
the 1980s. Recent developments include consortiums of private equity funds (club deals), exits
through secondary buyouts (sale to another LBO fund), and evidence of persistence in fund
returns. LBO deal financing has evolved towards lower leverage ratios. In Europe, recent deals
are financed with less leveraged loans and mezzanine debt and more high-yield debt than before.
Future research challenges include integrating analyses across transaction types and financing
mixes, and producing unbiased estimates of the expected return from buyout investments in the
presence of limited data on portfolio companies that do not return to public status.
∗This survey updates Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) with new data and research developments. It was in part
written while Thorburn was a Visiting Professorial Fellow at the Australian Business School at University of New
South Wales. We thank the editor, Franklin Allen, for helpful comments, and Michael E. Koester at Goldman Sachs
& Co. for information on LBO financing. Financial support from the Lindenauer Center for Corporate Governance
at the Tuck School of Business, and the assistance of Center Administrative Assistant Kate LeBrun in preparing this
document for publication, is also gratefully acknowledged.
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1 Introduction
Shocks to the corporate economic environment may give rise to severe organizational inefficiencies.
For example, a vertically integrated firm may find that long-term contracts and/or spot market
purchases of a key input have become more efficient. Or increased general capital market liquidity
may have rendered internal capital markets a relatively costly divisional funding mechanism for
conglomerates. High leverage may be optimal as financial innovations and expertise make it less
expensive to manage financial distress. Financial innovations and general market liquidity may also
render it optimal to securitize an entire division. The result is increased divisional managerial focus.
In this survey, we collectively refer to the transactions that implement these and other changes in
asset composition, financial contracting, and ownership structure as ”corporate restructuring”.
We focus the survey on two broad groups of corporate restructuring procedures: corporate
breakups and highly leveraged transactions. Corporate breakups include techniques to sell off
and/or securitize part of the firm. They include divestitures, spinoffs, equity carve-outs and,
for a brief period, tracking stock. Highly leveraged transactions involve a significant increase of
debt in the firm’s capital structure, either through a debt-financed special dividend in a leveraged
recapitalization, or in a leveraged buyouts (LBOs), in which the entire firm is acquired by a financial
buyer (a buyout fund).
In order to limit the scope of the survey, we do not review recapitalizations that do not involve
extensive use of leverage. Examples include state privatizations (Megginson and Netter, 2001),
conversions from mutual to stock companies (Masulis, 1987), and stock repurchases (Kalay and
Lemmon, 2008). Moreover, for a review of the broader literature on corporate takeovers and
takeover bidding involving strategic buyers, see Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008). Also, we
address distressed restructuring only tangentially (Hotchkiss, John, Mooradian, and Thorburn,
2008; Senbet and Wang, 2012).
As surveyed below, corporate restructuring may be initiated by top-level management, by di-
visional managers, or by outside sponsors like buyout funds. Occasionally, the restructuring is
defensive, arising in response to a control threat from the market for corporate control. Regard-
less of who initiates the transaction, the parties are likely seeking to improve operating efficiency,
increase cash flow, and ultimately, enhance firm profitability. In breakup transactions, the evi-
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dence suggests that assets are transferred to higher-value users, while highly leveraged transactions
involve optimizing capital structure, improving managerial incentives and achieving tax efficiency.
The survey is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the so-called diversification discount
and the potential costs of diversification, which motivate many breakup transactions. Chapter
3 through Chapter 6 then details the frequency, structure and economic effect of various types
of breakup transactions, beginning with divestitures (Chapter 3), spin-offs (Chapter 4), equity
carve-outs (Chapter 5), and ending with tracking stock (Chapter 6). Next, we review highly lever-
aged transactions, including leveraged recapitalizations (Chapter 7), and we provide an extensive
discussion of the empirical evidence on LBOs (Chapter 8). Chapter 9 concludes the survey.
2 Restructuring and the boundary of the firm
2.1 Breakups and the “conglomerate discount”
The economic boundary of the firm may be defined as the point where within-firm transactions
start to become more costly than arms-length (across market) transactions. There are numerous
theories for why within-firm transactions may economically dominate market transactions, ranging
from transactions costs (Coase, 1937) to agency costs and costs of imperfect contracting and moral
hazard.1
Alternatives to outright ownership of resources include renting (long- or short-term contracts)
and ”spot” market transactions to ensure continued operations of the firm. These organizational
alternatives have different implications for corporate taxes, firm-specific resource specialization and
development of appropriable quasi-rents (which in turn lead to bargaining issues and potential for
opportunistic behavior), investment decisions, risk-sharing and financing costs.
An asset such as an operating plant may have greater value as a division of a conglomerate than
as a stand-alone ”pure play” entity. As emphasized by Maksimovic and Phillips (2007), implicit
in the belief that conglomerates create value is the idea that industries differ materially in the
skills and resources which are required to operate efficiently, and that this diversity of operating
environments affects the cost of performing transactions within the firm. These costs could be due
1See, e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976), Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Williamson (1985), Grossman and
Hart (1986), Jensen (1986), Hart and Moore (1990).
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to financial externalities across industries, such as improved risk sharing within the firm, or real
externalities that could arise due to the use of a shared factor of production.
The value of using shared resources, such as managerial time and internal capital, differs across
firms and industries as well as through time as the boundaries of the firm change. For example,
Comment and Jarrell (1995) document an increase in corporate focus in the 1980s. They show
that 56% of exchange listed firms had a single business segment in 1988 compared to 38% in 1979.
Breakup transactions create value when such synergies from conglomeration become negative, i.e.,
when the costs of keeping the company’s assets together exceed the benefits from doing so.
The corporate finance literature on diversification took off with the discovery of the “conglom-
erate discount” by Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995). The discount is measured
as the difference between the market value of the diversified firm and the sum of the estimated
values of the (non-traded) divisions. The latter are estimated using multiples from single-segment
(”pure play”) competitors. Berger and Ofek (1995) report a diversification discount of 13-15% for
US publicly traded firms in the 1986–1991 period.
Internationally, Lins and Servaes (1999) analyze publicly traded firms from Germany, Japan
and the UK in 1992 and 1994. They report a significant discount of 10% in Japan and 15% in the
UK, but do not find evidence of a discount in Germany. Their study suggests that, for Japan, the
conglomerate discount only appears for firms with a strong Keiretsu affiliation. Fauver, Houston,
and Naranjo (2003) study more than 8,000 firms from 35 countries and find that the financial, legal,
and regulatory environments each have an important influence on the value of diversification.
Empirical research has extended and reinterpreted the early results on the conglomerate dis-
count. Lamont and Polk (2002) and Campa and Kedia (2002) make the point that, since firms
endogenously choose to diversify, exogenous variation in diversification is required to draw infer-
ences about its causal effect on firm value. Lamont and Polk (2002) find that exogenous changes
in corporate ”diversity” (defined as the within-firm dispersion of industry investment) are nega-
tively related to firm value. Thus, they argue that diversification destroys value. However, Campa
and Kedia (2002) find that firms with low value are more likely to diversify. Controlling for this
self-selection, the diversification discount drops and sometimes turns into a premium.
Maksimovic and Phillips (2007) conclude that diversified firms predominantly behave like value
maximizers given their productivity and that internal capital markets tend to facilitate the efficient
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transfer of resources. However, they also point to ambiguities reflecting econometric issues of
endogeneity and self-selection, as well as choice of data and industry classifications, at various steps
of the overall test strategy. They further conclude that “there is some evidence that conglomerate
firms that are busted up had investment patterns that varied from the neoclassical model” (p.
472). A sample of diversified firms that divested one or more divisions is more likely to be facing
significant diversification costs than a random sample of conglomerates.
The literature on breakup transactions provides several examples of diversification costs and
how they may distort investment. Scharfstein and Stein (2000) describe conditions under which top
management inefficiently allocates too much funds to divisions with poor investment opportunities
(cross-subsidization). Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) argue that investment choices may be
distorted because top management cannot commit to future distribution of funds until a surplus
has been realized. Goldman (2004) models the resource allocation inside a multi-division firm of a
manager with stock-based compensation, and shows that the investment incentives improve after
a spinoff of a division.
Another potential cost of diversification is related to executive compensation: the division being
a private entity, it is difficult to tie divisional manager compensation directly to the underlying value
of the operations under their control. Stock-based compensation policies may be critical to induce
optimal investment decisions, and to retain managerial talent in a competitive labor market. A
separate listing of subsidiary stock resolves such compensation issues, lowering agency costs and
increasing market value.2
Yet another motivation for breakup transactions is that conglomeration accentuates informa-
tion asymmetries between investors and corporate insiders. Nanda and Narayanan (1999) model a
diversified firm’s decision to divest a division that is undervalued by the market. Outside investors
observe the aggregated (conglomerate) cash flow only, while management also observes the divi-
sional cash flows. Without detailed divisional information, the market rationally assigns an average
performance to each division. This pooling results in undervaluation of the well-performing division
and overvaluation of the poorly performing division. In this situation, it may be optimal to divest
the overvalued (underperforming) division in order to lower the cost of capital for the undervalued
division.
2See Aron (1991) for a model of this effect in the context of spinoffs.
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A related information-based argument is that conglomerates operating in a wide range of indus-
tries are more difficult for analysts to value. This is true both because analysts tend to specialize in
certain industries and because divisions may be relatively opaque in terms of financial information.
A breakup may lead to increased analyst following and improved quality of the information avail-
able to investors. Liu (2005) also argues that a breakup allows outsiders to discover firm value at a
lower cost. He presents an equilibrium in which high-value firms break up to separate themselves
from low-value firms, predicting a positive market reaction to breakup announcements.
The breakup motivations discussed above are all consistent with firm value maximization. How-
ever, Boot (1992) argues that self-interested managers are reluctant to sell assets because a divesti-
ture may signal poor managerial quality. He claims that there are too few divestitures in reality,
compared to the level that is optimal for shareholder wealth. Boot (1992) proposes that corporate
control transactions play a critical role in enforcing more divestitures, for example by forcing man-
agers to sell a “crown jewel” to prevent a takeover of the firm. Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995)
also argue that managers value control and won’t sell assets to promote operating efficiency alone.
They suggest that assets are sold only when the firm is financially constrained and a divestiture is
the least expensive way to raise capital.
These arguments emphasize how breakups create value by reversing negative synergies. How-
ever, a divisional or asset sale may also be the result of the demand side: the assets may simply be
worth more under the buyer’s control. That is, the buyer may be a higher-quality manager and the
divisional resources may offer a greater potential for synergies when merged with the acquiring firm.
Also, corporate breakups may be forced by regulatory actions such as antitrust or by bankruptcy
court.
2.2 Highly leveraged transactions
In a highly leveraged transaction, the focus of the restructuring is on the economic effects of the
leverage increase. Whether undertaking a debt-financed dividend (leveraged recap), or a leveraged
purchase of a division or the entire firm (LBO, where the firm goes private), it is the leverage increase
rather than any concomitant asset restructuring that provides the main economic motivation for
the transaction. As a result, LBOs tend to involve financial (as opposed to strategic) buyers, such
as buyout funds.
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The literature points to several possible sources of gains in leverage-increasing transactions.
Under the classical trade-off theory of debt, firms move to a higher level of debt in order to capitalize
on the corporate debt tax shield provided by the (U.S.) tax law.3 In addition to the potential for
corporate tax benefits, the literature emphasizes beneficial managerial incentive and monitoring
effects of higher leverage. Some highly leveraged firms may also gain a strategic advantage in
product markets. On the other hand, high leverage is not for everyone: under conditions of financial
distress, a debt overhang tends to prevent efficient investments (Myers, 1977).
In terms of managerial incentives, Ross (1977) presents a signaling model in which managers
who face personal bankruptcy costs signal their private information about higher future expected
cash flows by committing to a greater corporate debt level. In the vernacular of Jensen (1986),
entrenched managers prefer to overinvest rather than pay out the firm’s ”free cash flow” as dividends
(where free cash flow is defined as corporate liquid funds in excess of what is required to fund all
positive net present value projects).
A leveraged recapitalization, where the firm increases its debt without retaining the proceeds
(thus increasing leverage ratios), reduces Jensen’s overinvestment problem by precommitting to
disgorge future cash flows in the form of interest payment. Jensen (1986) further argues that the
greater risk of financial distress associated with higher leverage also helps discipline managerial in-
vestment policies. Stulz (1990) formalizes this intuition and shows that high leverage is particularly
valuable when investment opportunities are poor, even if the free cash flow is negative.
Increasing leverage also allows wealth constrained managers to hold a greater percentage of
total equity after the transaction is completed. For example, in a leveraged recapitalization, the
debt may be paid out as cash dividend to non-managerial stockholders and as a stock dividend (or
a cash dividend that is immediately reinvested in the firm) to managers. In an LBO, the managers
may roll over their equity investment, while other equity-holders are paid out, again increasing
managers’ fractional equity ownership. The incentive effect of such greater managerial equity
ownership helps reduce manager-shareholder conflicts of interest. Garvey (1992, 1995) explore the
conditions under which leverage and management equity ownership are complementary in reducing
the overinvestment problem of free cash flow.
Highly leveraged transactions may also lead to improved monitoring by banks, and by the
3Frank and Goyal (2008) and Parsons and Titman (2008) review corporate leverage policies.
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LBO sponsor who has its own money at risk in the transaction. Jensen (1989) argues that ac-
tive governance by buyout sponsors and high-powered managerial incentives, combined with the
pressure from high leverage, provides an incentive structure that is superior to that of public firms
with dispersed ownership and weak governance. He suggests that the LBO organizational form
may ”eclipse” the traditional corporate form, a prediction that has yet to be proven (Kaplan and
Stromberg, 2009).
Moreover, highly leveraged transactions may cause wealth transfers across the firm’s various
constituencies. For example, bonds that lack protective covenants may become more junior in the
capital structure, resulting in a bondholder loss (benefiting shareholders). It is also possible that
incumbent managers participating in a leveraged buyout have inside information about the firm’s
future prospects, expropriating selling shareholders. Muller and Panunzi (2004) argue that the
LBO sponsor may be in a position to expropriate minority shareholders by merging the firm with
the raider’s leveraged acquisition subsidiary. Perotti and Spier (1993) present a model in which
the firm gains bargaining power in contracting renegotiations by temporarily increasing leverage.
Specifically, after retiring equity through a junior debt issue, shareholders threaten to underinvest
in valuable new projects unless employees concede to wage reductions. Finally, there is a growing
literature linking leverage to the firm’s strategic position in product markets. See Maksimovic
(1995) and Parsons and Titman (2008) for reviews of this literature.
We now turn to a detailed description of the empirical evidence on breakups and highly leveraged
transactions. In the course of discussing the evidence, we return to several of the hypotheses outlined
above.
3 Divestitures
A divestiture is the sale of a portion of the firm’s assets to a third party—typically another company
or a buyout fund—in a private transaction. The assets that are sold may be a division, segment,
subsidiary, or product line. In return, the seller typically receives cash, but sometimes also securities
or a combination of both. The proceeds from the sale are reinvested in the remaining business or
distributed to the firm’s claim holders. While eliminating a fraction of its assets, the selling firm
continues to exist in essentially the same form as before. Divestitures may trigger a substantial tax
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liability: the difference between the proceeds from the sale and the firm’s tax basis in the assets is
a capital gain or capital loss, which is taxed at the corporate tax rate.
3.1 Transaction volume
In 2011, U.S. corporations announced 2,919 divestitures with a total deal value of $320 billion
(source: Mergerstat Review). 377 of these transactions had a deal value exceeding $100 billion,
while 71 transactions had a value of $1 trillion or more. The line in Panel A of Figure 1 shows the
annual number and the bars show the annual dollar volume of U.S. divestitures over the period
1980–2011. The number of transactions was relatively stable between 1980 and 1995. Since the
mid 1990s, however, the divestiture activity tripled and reached record high levels in 2005–2006.
After a drop in deal activity through the financial crises, the level of divestitures recovered quite
well in 2010 and 2011.
The most aggressive U.S. divesters of subsidiaries and divisions in 2011 was General Electric
(12 divestitures), followed by Bank of America (11), Exxon Mobil (11), Citigroup (10), and asset
management firm The Carlyle Group (11). Two of these sellers—General Electric and Citigroup—
were also among the most aggressive divesters in 2010. In addition, General Electric was on the
Mergerstat Review list of aggressive buyers in 2011, with 27 acquisitions.
The total divestiture activity tracks closely the merger and acquisition (M&A) activity in the
economy. Panel B of Figure 1 shows the annual number of U.S. divestitures as a percentage of all
U.S. takeovers from 1970 and forward. While the number of divestitures increased sharply in the
second half of the 1990s, it fell behind the even greater increase in M&A volume over the same
period. This trend was reversed once the takeover activity slowed after the turn of the century. In
2011, divestitures made up 31% of all M&A transactions, somewhat below the annual average of
37% over the whole 1970–2011 period.
3.2 Valuation effects
Panel A of Table 1 shows the stock price reaction of the divesting firm for 24 studies of divestiture
announcements in the period 1963-2005. The studies generally report the cumulative abnormal
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stock return (CAR) over the two-day interval (-1, 0) where day 0 is the announcement day.4 More
recent studies often include day +1 as well, to capture the effect of an announcement after the
closing of the stock exchange or misreporting of the announcement date. The average CAR for the
announcements are positive—ranging from 0.3% to 3.4% across the different samples—and almost
all of the estimates are statistically significant at the 1%-level (two-sided t-test against zero). The
sample-size-weighted average CAR for the combined sample of 7,544 divestitures is 1.2%. In sum,
the evidence indicates that the average divestiture increases the value of the selling firm.
As further shown in the table, firms sell one-fifth of their total assets in the average transaction.
Several studies find that the seller firm announcement returns are increasing in the relative size
of the divested assets (Zaima and Hearth, 1985; Klein, 1986; Mulherin and Boone, 2000). It is
possible that the returns on asset sales are independent of the size of the assets, so that relatively
larger assets have a greater impact on the parent firm’s return. This is similar to the effect of the
relative size of the target on bidder returns documented in the takeover literature and reviewed in
Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008).
Klein (1986) reports that the disclosure of the sales price is central to the market’s assessment
of the transaction. She finds a positive seller stock price reaction only when the price is disclosed at
the initial divestiture announcement. Firms that fail to announce the transaction price have CARs
close to zero. The significance of price disclosure is confirmed by Afshar, Taﬄer, and Sudarsanam
(1992) and Sicherman and Pettway (1992). Clubb and Stouraitis (2002) find that the announcement
returns tend to increase with the difference between the sales price and an estimated value of the
assets in their current use. Overall, this suggests that the market’s valuation of the transaction
depends on the sales price relative to the value of the assets when operated by the firm.
The abnormal returns on divestiture announcements are positive also for buyers. For eight
studies with data for the period 1963–2002 and listed in Panel B, the average buyer announcement
CAR ranges from 0.0% to 2.3%. The sample-size-weighted buyer average CAR (ACAR) is 1.2%
for the combined sample of 2,300 divestiture announcements. Note, however, that the study by
Benou, Madua, and Ngo (2008) of 872 high-tech divestitures in the period 1981-2001 generates
4A typical approach is to estimate the parameters using a single-factor market model over approximately a year
prior to the event: Rjt = αj+βjRmt+jt, where Rjt is the stock return of firm j and Rmt is the market return on day
t. The abnormal return ARjτ over event day τ is computed as ARjτ = Rjτ − (αˆj + βˆjRmτ ), where αˆj and βˆj are the
coefficient estimates from the time series regression. The cumulative abnormal return is CAR(τ1, tau2) = Σ
τ2
τ=τ1ARjτ ,
where τ1 and τ2 define the event window relative to the announcement day 0.
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much larger buyer returns than prior studies. Excluding this study from the total sample reduces
buyer returns to a sample-size weighted average of 0.5%—still positive, but of a smaller magnitude
than for sellers. Sicherman and Pettway (1992) document a size effect in the buyer’s stock price
reaction similar to that of sellers, i.e. buyer returns tend to increase with the relative size of the
acquired assets.
While both sellers and buyers appear to gain from a divestiture, the division of the total gains
depends on the relative bargaining strength of the two parties. Sicherman and Pettway (1992) use
a debt downgrade prior to the asset sale as an indication of a weaker bargaining position vis-a-vis
the buyer. As expected, they find significantly lower CARs for sellers who’s debt was downgraded
prior to the transaction. Moreover, the value creation is conditional on the successful completion
of the divestiture. Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987) show that the seller stock price drops back to its
initial level if a previously announced divestiture is canceled. In addition, announcement returns
are positive for buyers completing the transaction, but insignificant for buyers in transactions that
subsequently fail.
3.3 Drivers of value-creation in divestitures
The positive announcement returns for sellers and buyers indicate that divestitures generally create
value. We now turn to the evidence on the potential reasons for this value creation.
3.3.1 Increase in corporate focus
The typical divestiture involves sales of assets that are outside of the diversified firm’s core business,
and it results in an increased focus of the remaining operations. John and Ofek (1995) show that
three-quarters of divested segments are unrelated to the seller’s core business, defined as its primary
four-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code. Moreover, using various measures for firm
focus, they find that sellers become more focused after the divestiture. Their focus measures include
a sales-based Herfindahl index across the firm’s business segments, the total number of business
lines reported by the firm, and whether the divested division is outside the firm’s core business.
Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002) find that firms tend to divest non-core segments that
are relatively small. Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) and Kaplan and Weisback (1992) show that
firms are more likely to sell peripheral assets. Kaiser and Stouraitis (2001b) describe how Thorn
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EMI successfully raised cash by selling unrelated assets, reinvesting the proceeds in the company’s
core business. In sum, divested assets are typically outside the firm’s core business and the asset
sales result in an increased focus of the firm’s remaining operations.
An increase in corporate focus may create value if it allows management to focus their attention
on the core business and therefore run the firm more efficiently. John and Ofek (1995) find that
the divestment announcement returns are positively related to measures capturing the increase in
focus. Moreover, the operating profitability of the remaining assets increases after a divestiture,
but only for the firms that become more focused. Denis and Shome (2005) show that large firms
downsizing their assets become more focused and increase their operating performance. Berger
and Ofek (1999) document average CARs of 7% for focusing-related announcements by diversified
firms. Overall, there is substantial evidence that the value creation from divestitures is related to
the resulting increase in business focus of the divesting firm.
3.3.2 Elimination of negative synergies
If the divested segment has negative synergies with other divisions of the diversified firms, the
divestiture will create value simply by eliminating these negative synergies. Dittmar and Shiv-
dasani (2003) examine the investment efficiency of divesting firms. They find that the sale of a
business segment is associated with a reduction of the diversification discount. Moreover, they doc-
ument significant improvements in the investment decisions of the firm’s remaining segments after
the divestiture. Specifically, the investment level increases for segments that underinvest relative
to single-segment firms and decreases for segments that overinvest relative to their peers. They
also find that the announcement returns are higher the greater the subsequent reduction in the
diversification discount and the greater the improvement in segment investments. Overall, their
evidence suggests that divestitures create value by reducing costly cross-subsidization of inefficient
investments in the diversified firm.
Colak and Whited (2007) reach a very different conclusion, addressing the endogeneity of
breakup decisions. They confirm that firms selecting a divestiture or spinoff are different from
their peers: the firms that restructure are typically larger and more diversified, and are in rela-
tively fast-growing industries. Controlling for these differences, they show that although spinoffs
and divestitures are associated with improved investment efficiency, these improvements are not
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directly caused by the restructuring itself.
Kaplan and Weisback (1992) examine whether divestitures are evidence of failed acquisitions.
Studying a sample of 271 large firms acquired between 1971 and 1982, they find that 44% of the
targets were sold by the end of 1989. Only one-third of the divested segments are classified as
failed acquisitions, however, based on accounting profitability and comments by managers and the
business press. Kaplan and Weisback (1992) conclude that acquirers sell businesses that they have
improved or that they once had synergies with but no longer do.5
3.3.3 Better fit with the buyer
As discussed above, a divestiture will create value if the assets are worth more to the buyer than
the value in their current use. A buyer could, for example, have substantial synergies or superior
management skills. John and Ofek (1995) find that seller announcement returns are higher when
the buyer have some comparative advantage in managing the assets, such as a buyer operating in
the same industry as the divested division or a leveraged buyout group.
Using U.S. Bureau of Census data, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) examine the effect of asset
sales on the productivity at the plant level. They show that divestitures are more likely in business
cycle upturns, when the assets are less productive than industry benchmarks, when the selling
division is less efficient than the buyer, and when the firm has more efficient divisions in other
industries. They conclude that most divestitures result in productivity gains by redeploying assets
from relatively low-productivity sellers to higher-ability buyers.
Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2003) also study the efficiency of the reallocation of assets in
divestitures. They use Tobin’s q, defined as the ratio between the market value and the replacement
cost (here the book value) of the assets, as a proxy for management’s capability to manage the
assets. They find that the announcement returns are highest for transactions where the buyer has a
relatively high q and the seller has a relatively low q, possibly because the assets are transferred to
a better managed firm. Overall, the evidence suggests that divestitures create value by transferring
assets to higher-valuation buyers.
5Fluck and Lynch (1999) model how firms make diversifying acquisitions to help finance marginally profitable
projects, to subsequently divest these subsidiaries once the projects are profitable and can generate the necessary
funds internally.
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3.4 Corporate governance
3.4.1 Agency issues
Although a divestiture may be necessary to maximize shareholder wealth, some incumbent man-
agements resist parting from assets. Berger and Ofek (1999) find that announcements of focus-
increasing transactions often are preceded by corporate control and incentive-altering events, in-
cluding management turnover, outside shareholder pressure, changes in management compensation,
and unsuccessful takeover attempts. Gillan, Kensinger, and Martin (2000) describe how Sears an-
nounced the divestiture of financial services and refocusing on retail first after a long period of poor
performance and coincident with substantial pressure from institutional investor activists. This
suggests that the restructuring may have been postponed until it could not be delayed any longer.
Consistent with a reluctance to sell assets, the monitoring of and incentives provided to top
management are critical to the value created by a divestiture. Tehranian, Travlos, and Waegelein
(1987) document significantly higher announcement returns for divesting firms that provide long-
term performance plans to their top executives. Hirschey and Zaima (1989) find higher announce-
ment returns for divestitures by companies with concentrated ownership than sales by widely held
firms. Also, the returns are higher for firms where insiders are net-buyers of the firm’s stock over
the preceding six-month period. Hanson and Song (2000) further show that divestiture gains are
increasing in the fraction of outside directors on the board and the percentage equity ownership
of the management team. Pointing to the importance of banks as monitors, Hirschey, Slovin, and
Zaima (1990) find some evidence of higher announcement returns for divestitures by firms with
bank debt. Overall, firms with better monitoring and more managerial share ownership seem to
make divestiture decisions that create more value.
The proceeds received by the divesting firm may be reinvested in the firm’s remaining operations,
used to retire debt, or distributed to shareholders. Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) and Kaiser and
Stouraitis (2001a) show that the announcement returns are positive when the proceeds are used to
pay back debt, but insignificant for firms that reinvest the proceeds. Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro
(1995) also find higher announcement returns when the proceeds are paid out. Ataullah, Davidson,
and Le (2010) show that shareholder announcement returns increase with the shareownership of
the CEO for firms that retain the proceeds. This suggests that management may employ the funds
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inefficiently if retained by the firm.
Bates (2005) examines the corporate payout and retention decision for 400 large asset sales
between 1990 and 1998. He finds that the probability of retaining the cash proceeds increases in
the divesting firm’s growth opportunities, measured by its market-to-book ratio. However, firms
retaining the proceeds consistently overinvest (have higher capital expenditure) relative to their
industry peers. Also, the higher the equity ownership of officers and directors, the more likely is it
that the sale proceeds are paid out. The evidence is again consistent with investment inefficiencies
associated with the retention of proceeds from asset sales.
3.4.2 Financial distress
Several studies indicate that asset sales are used as a way of generating cash when the firm is
financially constrained. Divestiture announcements are typically preceded by a period of negative
stock returns (Alexander, Benson, and Kampmeyer, 1984; Jain, 1985; Hanson and Song, 2003) and
poor operating performance (Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995; Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling,
2002; Brown, James, and Mooradian, 1994). Moreover, firms with high leverage are more likely
to sell assets (Ofek, 1993; Kruse, 2002). Officer (2007) shows that divesting firms have lower cash
balances, cash flow, and bond ratings than size- and industry-matched control firms, all of which
suggest that the sellers are liquidity constrained. Also, Nixon, Roenfeldt, and Sicherman (2000)
find that financially distressed firms prefer a divestiture to a spinoff, which does not generate cash.
In addition, Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1992), Ofek (1993) and other show that firms in
financial distress frequently sell assets as part of the restructuring process.
The optimal use of proceeds from asset sales change when the firm is in financial distress. The
firm’s ability to pay dividends to shareholders is typically limited by debt covenants at this point,
and the choice stands between reinvestment in the business or repayment of debt. For a sample
of distressed firms, Brown, James, and Mooradian (1994) show that shareholder announcement
returns are significantly higher when the proceeds are retained by the firm rather than used to
repay debt. Also as expected, bondholder announcement returns are higher when the proceeds
are used to pay off debt. Brown, James, and Mooradian (1994) suggest that creditor influence
over distressed firms may force asset sales that benefits the firm’s creditors to the detriment of
shareholders. Datta and Iskandar-Datta (1996) find that divestitures by financially distressed firms
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generate positive announcement returns for bondholders, but not for shareholders.
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that financially distressed firms sell assets at depressed prices
to lower-valuation industry outsiders because higher-valuation industry insiders are liquidity con-
strained. Consistent with this argument, Pulvino (1998) finds that financially constrained airlines
sell aircrafts at lower prices than their unconstrained competitors. Moreover, Officer (2007) shows
that acquisition multiples are lower when the parent firm has experienced negative abnormal stock
returns over the year leading up to the sale and when the corporate loan spread above treasury
rates are high. Also, Ramey and Shapiro (2001) show that more specialized assets sell at greater
discounts, and that discounts are greater when assets are sold to industry outsiders than to industry
insiders. Examining firms auctioned in Swedish bankruptcy, however, Eckbo and Thorburn (2008)
reject the fire-sale hypothesis: they find little evidence of fire-sale discounts when assets are sold
as going concerns.6
Liquidity may be a factor in the decision to sell assets. Kim (1998) documents that managers
sell their most liquid assets first, before selling more illiquid assets. Moreover, Mulherin and Boone
(2000) and Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002) show that breakup transactions tend to
cluster in industries where the aggregate corporate transaction volume is large, i.e. in industries
with relatively liquid markets for corporate assets.
4 Spinoffs
In a spinoff, a public company distributes its equity ownership in a subsidiary to its shareholders.
The distribution is a pro-rata dividend and parent shareholders receive subsidiary stock in propor-
tion to their ownership in the parent firm. The spinoff involves a complete separation of the two
firms. After the spinoff, the subsidiary becomes a publicly traded company with a unique ticker
symbol and an independent board of directors. In contrast to a divestiture, a spinoff does not
generate any cash proceeds for the parent company. Also, since the spinoff involves a public listing
of shares, it has higher transaction costs and takes longer time than a divestiture.
A spinoff may be structured as a tax free transaction if it qualifies under Section 355 of the
Internal Revenue Code. Among the most important requirements under Section 355 are (i) the
6See Hotchkiss, John, Mooradian, and Thorburn (2008) for a more detailed review of asset restructurings by
financially distressed firms.
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parent must have control of the subsidiary (own at least 80% of the voting rights) prior to the
distribution; (ii) the parent must distribute control (at least 80% of the votes) to shareholders and
retain no practical control of the subsidiary; (iii) the spinoff must have a valid business purpose;
and (iv) the parent or the subsidiary cannot be acquired within two years after the spinoff. If
the spinoff qualifies under Section 355, there is no tax on the distribution of stock, neither at the
parent nor at the shareholder level. Most spinoffs in the United States are structured as tax free
transactions.
If a spinoff does not qualify under section 355, however, the distribution is taxed as a property
dividend. The parent recognizes a gain equal to the difference between the fair market value of the
subsidiary and the parent’s tax basis in the subsidiary, similar to a capital gain. This imputed gain
is taxed at the corporate tax rate. Moreover, shareholders pay a dividend tax on the fair market
value of the subsidiary (the distributed subsidiary stock).
The condition under Section 355 requiring that the subsidiary is not acquired within two years
of the spinoff is outside the parent company’s control. Yet, a potential acquisition of the subsidiary
after a tax free spinoff would trigger an often substantial tax liability at the parent company level.
To transfer the cost of this potential liability to the subsidiary and thus ultimately the acquirer, it
is common practice that the subsidiary contractually commits to pay any such future tax liability
of the parent, would the subsidiary be acquired within two years of the spinoff.
Maydew, Schipper, and Vincent (1999) compare 52 tax free spinoffs with 218 divestitures in the
period 1987-1995. They find that tax costs average 8% of the divested assets. They suggest that
managers prefer a taxable assets sale when the sales price is high enough to offset the associated
tax cost.
4.1 Transaction volume
Using data from Thompson SDC Platinum (SDC), Panel A of Figure 2 plots the total deal value
(bars) and annual number (line) of spinoffs announced worldwide between 1985 and 2012.7 The
number of spinoffs soared in the second half of the 1990s, and reached a peak in year 2000 with over
200 transactions and a total market value of $225 billion. Many companies tried to take advantage
7Only 56% of the announced spinoffs are coded by SDC as completed. The rest are classified largely as pending
(27%), unknown (5%) or withdrawn (10%). Since many older spinoffs are coded as still pending, we ignore the deal
status and report statistics for all announced spinoffs.
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of the higher valuation multiple investors were willing to pay for activities in the technology and
internet sector by splitting off subsidiaries and divisions in that space.
While the interest for spinoffs plummeted with the burst of the internet bubble, the deal activity
recovered through 2006 and 2007. The spinoff dollar deal volume fell again drastically with the
onset of the financial crises and reached a trough in 2009, but has recovered through 2010 and 2011.
In 2012, there were a total of 172 spinoffs announced globally for a combined value of $16 billion.
The largest U.S. transactions announced in 2012 were the spinoffs of The WhiteWave Foods from
Dean Foods ($1.9 billion), Liberty Spinco from Liberty Media ($1.7 billion) and Sears Hometown
and Outlet Stores from Sears Holdings ($0.7 billion). Internationally, the largest transactions were
the spinoff of the tire manufacturer Hankook Tire, Korea ($5.4 billion); the separation of two mines
in Sibanye Gold from Gold Fields, South Africa ($1.1 billion); and the split of PetroBakken Energy
from Petrobank, Canada ($1.1 billion).
4.2 Valuation effects
The results from 24 selected studies estimating shareholder gains from spinoff announcements are
listed in Table 2. The samples contain a total of 2,957 spinoffs announced between 1962 and 2007.
Shareholder average cumulative abnormal returns are significantly positive and ranges from 1.7–
5.6% across the various studies. The lowest average CAR of 1.7% is for a sample of 156 European
spinoffs announced in 1987–2000 and examined by Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004). Combining
the 24 studies, the sample-size-weighted abnormal announcement return is 3.3%.
The average CAR of 3.3% in spinoffs is higher than the 1.2% average CAR for divestitures
reported above. Recall, however, that also buyers tend to experience positive announcement returns
in divestitures (average CAR of 1.2%). In contrast, the total gains from a spinoff is reflected in the
parent company stock. Thus, some of the difference in announcement returns between spinoffs and
divestitures could be explained by buyers sharing in the value creation from the latter transaction.
Table 2 further shows that the market value of the subsidiary is about one-quarter of that of
its parent in the average spinoff. As for divestitures, the announcement returns for spinoffs are
increasing in the relative size of the subsidiary. Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) show that shareholder
CARs are on average greater in spinoffs of subsidiaries with a market value exceeding 10% of the
parent company’s market value compared to spinoffs of relatively small subsidiaries. In addition,
17
Alli, Ramirez, and Yung (2001) find insignificant announcement returns for 47 spinoffs that are sub-
sequently withdrawn, as if the market anticipates the withdrawal at the time of the announcement.
See also Harris and Madura (2011) for more recent evidence on withdrawn spinoffs.
The evidence of positive announcement returns for spinoffs is compelling. Some studies also
report long-term returns following spinoffs. Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1993) estimate the
buy-and-hold stock returns for parents and subsidiaries spun off in the 1965–1988 period. They
find positive average returns for holding periods of 24 and 36 months compared with portfolios of
industry-and size-matched stocks. McConnell, Ozbilgin, and Wahal (2001) investigate portfolios of
parents and subsidiaries in 89 spinoffs between 1989 and 1995. In contrast to the earlier work, they
find little evidence of higher average buy-and-hold returns compared to portfolios matched on size
and book-to-market. Also, using the Fama and French (1993) three factor model as a benchmark,
they reject the hypothesis that portfolios of spinoff companies exhibit abnormal returns. Klein and
Rosenfeld (2010) show that “sponsored” spinoffs, where an outside investor purchases a substantial
equity stake in the newly created firm around the spinoff date, perform worse than “conventional”
spinoffs over a three-year period following the transaction.
4.3 Drivers of value-creation in spinoffs
4.3.1 Increased corporate focus
As with divestitures, a potential source of value creation in spinoffs is the increase in corporate
focus resulting from the elimination of unrelated divisions. Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar (1997)
report that the positive announcement returns are limited to spinoffs that increase corporate focus,
defined as the parent and subsidiary having different two-digit SIC industry codes. They document
substantial improvements in the return on assets for parents in focus-increasing spinoffs, but not for
parents where the spun off subsidiary is in a related industry. Moreover, Desai and Jain (1999) find
that focus-increasing spinoffs have significantly higher announcement returns, long-run abnormal
stock returns, and improvements in operating performance than do non-focus increasing spinoffs.
Burch and Nanda (2003) estimate the change in the parent firm’s diversification discount from
the year prior to the year after the spinoff. They find that the diversification discount is reduced
when the spinoff increases corporate focus, but not otherwise. Overall, the evidence suggests that
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shareholder gains in spinoffs are associated with a subsequent increase in firm focus.
Jain, Kini, and Shenoy (2011) investigate firms’ decision to vertically disintegrate through a
spinoff or an equity carveout. They find that the likelihood of vertical disintegration increases with
positive subsidiary industry demand shocks and financing conditions, and decreases with parent
firm relative productivity. They find significantly positive announcement returns for parent firms,
their rivals and subsidiary supplier firms, suggesting that vertical divestitures result in efficiency
gains to parent firms due to enhanced focus.
Dittmar (2004) examines the capital structure choice of spunoff firms and their former parents.
She shows that subsidiary debt levels are closer to (although still higher than) that of their industry
rivals. Moreover, small subsidiaries with high growth opportunities have lower leverage ratios, while
large subsidiaries with high collateral value have higher leverage ratios than do their parents. Thus,
it appears that a spinoff allows the spunoff entities to adopt a more suitable capital structure.
4.3.2 Elimination of negative synergies
The separation of an unrelated business segment may further reduce any negative synergies that
exist between the subsidiary and the rest of the firm. Gertner, Powers, and Scharstein (2002) ex-
amine whether spinoffs help eliminate value-reducing cross-subsidization in diversified firms. They
show that the subsidiary’s investment decisions become much more sensitive to the firm’s invest-
ment opportunities after the spinoff. Specifically, the total capital expenditure decreases for firms
in low Tobin’s q industries and increases for firms in high q industries. These changes take place pri-
marily for subsidiaries whose operations are unrelated to the parent’s core business and in spinoffs
generating higher announcement returns.
Ahn and Denis (2004) further find that, prior to the spinoff, parent firms trade at a discount to
and invest less in their high-growth (high q) divisions than do their stand-alone peers. Following the
spinoff, however, the diversification discount is eliminated and investments have increased for the
high-growth segments. Also, McNeil and Moore (2005) show that subsidiary capital expenditures
move toward industry levels after the spinoff, both for previously rationed and subsidized divisions.
Announcement returns are greater when parent firms previously allocated capital in a seemingly
inefficient way, defined as rationing high q and subsidizing low q spunoff divisions, as is the reduction
in the diversification discount.
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Using plant level data from the Longitudinal Research Database, Chemmanur and Nandy (2009)
show that total factor productivity of plants remaining with the parent firm increases on average
immediately after the spinoff. This productivity improvement can be attributed to cost savings
and remains for the following five years. Overall, the evidence indicates that spinoffs create value
by improving the investment decisions in diversified firms.8
Allen, Lummer, McConnell, and Reed (1995) propose that spinoffs provide a way to unwind
unsuccessful prior acquisitions. They examine a sample of 94 spinoffs in which the spunoff entity
previously had been acquired by the parent firm. Their evidence suggests that the original acqui-
sition was value destroying: the average acquisition announcement return is negative both for the
acquirer and for the target and bidder combined. Moreover, the spinoff announcement return is
positive and negatively correlated to the acquisitions return, i.e. the greater the anticipated loss
from the acquisition, the larger the expected gain from the spinoff. While not identifying a unique
source for the value creation in spinoffs, these results are consistent with the elimination of negative
synergies between the parent and the subsidiary.
4.3.3 Wealth transfer from bondholders
A spinoff may increase shareholder value at the expense of the parent firm’s creditors by reducing
the total assets of the firm. Also, if the spinoff increases the volatility of the cash flows of the
two separate firms the expected payoff to debtholders will decrease, with a corresponding gain
to shareholders (Galai and Masulis, 1976). MacMinn and Brockett (1995) further argue that a
spinoff could transfer wealth from liability claimants by removing corporate assets from their reach.
Nevertheless, the impact of a spinoff on debtholders is limited by the existence of restrictive debt
covenants. Hite and Owers (1983) find insignificant bondholder abnormal returns for a sample of 31
spinoff announcements in 1963–1981, as do Schipper and Smith (1983). For a more recent sample
from the period 1995–2002, Veld and Veld-Merkulova (2008) find small but significantly positive
average bondholder returns around the spinoff announcement of 0.1% (median 0%).
In a case study of Marriott, however, Parrino (1997) documents a significant drop in the value of
Marriott’s bonds following its spinoff announcement. At the same time, shareholder announcement
8See also Fulghieri and Sevilir (2011) for a model of firms in industries with high human capital intensity, showing
that multidivisional firms can improve employee incentives to innovate through a spinoff.
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returns were positive, suggesting a wealth transfer from bondholders. Maxwell and Rao (2003)
examine monthly bond return data for a sample of 80 spinoffs between 1976 and 1997. They find
that parent bondholders tend to experience a price decline after the spinoff announcement. The
average abnormal bond return (adjusted for the treasury rate) in the month of the spinoff is -0.9%,
and decreasing in the relative size of the spunoff subsidiary. Consistent with a bondholder loss,
credit ratings are more likely to be downgraded than upgraded subsequent to the spinoff. They
find, however, that the combined value of the publicly traded debt and equity increases, suggesting
that a wealth transfer from bondholders could only explain part of the shareholder gains.
4.3.4 Information asymmetries
The aggregation of financial data across divisions may exacerbate informational asymmetries be-
tween outside investors and insiders for diversified firms. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999)
examine whether spinoffs reduce such information gaps, using the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts
and analysts’ forecast error as a measure for the information asymmetry. They find that spinoffs
are more common for firms with relatively high levels of information asymmetry compared to their
industry rivals. The announcement returns are higher for firms with a greater degree of information
asymmetry, and the information gap tends to decrease after the spinoff. Best, Best, and Agapos
(1998) also find that spinoff announcement returns are increasing in financial analysts’ earnings
forecast errors. Overall, this suggests that one source of value creation in spinoffs is the mitigation
of information asymmetries.
Analysts play an important role in producing and disseminating information about the firm.
Gilson, Healy, Noe, and Palepu (2001) study changes in the coverage by financial analysts for a
sample of 103 focus-increasing spinoffs and equity carveouts over 1990–1995. They document a
45% increase in analysts coverage in the three years following a breakup. The new analysts tend to
be specialists in the subsidiary’s industry. Moreover, the accuracy of the earnings forecast improves
by 30-50%, and in particular for the industry specialists. In sum, increases in corporate focus seem
to improve the information provided by analysts, both in quality and quantity.
Huson and MacKinnon (2003) further show that analysts tend to revise upwards their short-
term earnings forecast in response to a spinoff. Also, idiosyncratic stock return volatility increases
following a spinoff, and more so when the spunoff subsidiary is unrelated to the parent firm. They
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conclude that the stock price becomes more sensitive to firm-specific information, which benefits
informed traders relative to uninformed traders.9
4.3.5 Clientele effects
Previously combined into a single security, the spinoff creates an opportunity to hold the subsidiary
stock separately. This expansion of investors’ opportunity set increases liquidity and opportunities
for investor diversification. In a sample of 113 spinoffs during 1964 to 1990, Vijh (1994) finds
abnormal stock returns of 3.0% on the spinoff ex date, i.e. the day that the subsidiary starts
trading separately, accompanied by an increased trading volume. He attributes the positive returns
to higher demand for the parent and subsidiary stocks once they have been separated.
Abarbanell, Bushee, and Ready (2003) show that institutional investors rebalance their port-
folio holdings in parents and their spunoff subsidiaries dependent on the fund’s investment style
and fiduciary restrictions. However, they find little evidence that such rebalancing trades lead to
abnormal price pressures for parents or subsidiaries around the spinoff. Chemmanur and He (2007)
examine the trading of institutional investors in 66 spinoffs between 1999 and 2004. They find large
imbalances in the post-spinoff trading of parent and subsidiary stock: 46% of the trades are in the
opposite direction and trades in the same direction are heavily concentrated in one of the firms.
This imbalance increases in the measure of information asymmetry and the difference in beta risk
and growth rates between the parent and subsidiary. See also Bardong, Bartram, and Yadav (2008)
for evidence on the market microstructure environment for spinoffs. Overall, spinoffs seem to relax
a trading constraint that existed prior to the distribution of the subsidiary stock.
4.3.6 Increased probability of a takeover
The fact that is is now possible to acquire control of the division through a stock purchase increases
the likelihood that the division will become a future takeover target. The spinoff may also increase
the probability that the parent will become a target as the parent is now a smaller and more
focused firm. Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1993) examine 146 tax free spinoffs over the period
1965-1988 and show that both the parent and the spun off subsidiary are indeed more likely to
9See also Chemmanur and Liu (2011) for a model where the increased information production by institutional
investors affects firms’ choice of breakup transaction.
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become takeover targets, compared to a set of control firms matched on size and industry. They
suggest that the two pure plays created by a spinoff are more attractive as targets than the combined
company. Most of the takeovers occur two to three years after the spinoff, possibly to protect the
tax free status of the spinoff. Given the large premiums typically paid in control transactions, they
attribute the positive abnormal stock returns at the time of the spinoff to the increased probability
of being acquired. This inference is supported by Harris and Glegg (2008), who find that cross-
border spinoff announcements are higher when the subsidiary is located in a country with a more
active takeover market.
Chemmanur and Yan (2004) formalize this idea in a model where all shareholders benefit if
incumbent management loses control of a division to a more able rival. A spinoff forces the manager
either to work harder in running the firm or to relinquish control of one of the firms resulting from
the spinoff. Either outcome leads to an increase in the combined equity value of the two firms
resulting from the spinoff.
4.4 Corporate governance
Self-interested managers may be reluctant to downsize assets under their control. Ahn and Walker
(2007) study the importance of effective corporate governance for firms’ decision to spin off a sub-
sidiary. Their sample is 102 spinoffs between 1981 and 1997. They find that firms conducting
a spinoff have greater stock ownership by outside board members, and smaller and more hetero-
geneous boards relative to their peers. Following the spinoff, parent firms increase their market-
to-book ratios and reduce the diversification discount. They conclude that effective governance
increases the likelihood of a spinoff, which is a value-increasing strategy.
Wruck and Wruck (2002) examine the management team of the spunoff subsidiary. They show
that 21% of spinoff top managers are outsiders, while 48% of the insiders are parent company top
managers rather than division heads. They argue that subsidiary managers lack the corporate
governance expertise required when the former division becomes publicly traded. Announcement
returns are highest for spunoff subsidiaries led by a parent firm top manager and a division head,
combining corporate governance and operating expertise.
In a spinoff, the parent management can design the governance structure of the subsidiary
without seeking approval from shareholders. Daines and Kausner (2004) find that the charters of
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spunoff subsidiaries include substantially more takeover defenses than do the charters of a sample
of size- and industry-matched IPO firms, where shareholders have a say on the corporate charter.
Moreover, the spunoff firms tend to have more takeover protection than do their parents. Chem-
manur, Jordan, Liu, and Wu (2010) find that parent firms with more antitakeover provisions have
significantly higher announcement returns and greater improvements in operating performance af-
ter the spinoff. While these firms tend to reduce the number of antitakeover provisions after the
spinoff, the unit that the CEO continues to run has more antitakeover provisions than the other
firms resulting from the spinoff. See also Harris and Madura (2010) for evidence on poison pill
adoptions by spunoff subsidiaries. Overall, it appears that managers prefer more takeover defenses
than shareholders do.
Pyo (2007) find that pay-performance sensitivity increases for subsidiary CEOs after a spinoff.
The higher the pay-performance sensitivity, the greater the improvements in operating performance
post-spinoff. Seward and Walsh (1995) propose that the likelihood of becoming a takeover target
should be higher for spunoff firms with little CEO equity incentives. They find that the takeover
probability—hostile as well as friendly—increases with the CEO’s stock and option ownership in
the spunoff subsidiary. While not discussed by Seward and Walsh (1995), it is possible that CEOs
with relatively low pay-performance sensitivity also adopt more takeover defenses in the spunoff
firm.
Allen (2001) examines the post-spinoff trades of senior managers, directors and blockholders in
193 public subsidiaries and their parents over the period 1978–1991. He finds that insiders who
trade during the first year following the spinoff earn excess returns of 36% over the subsequent
12-month period. He suggests that insiders take advantage of the spinoff as an opportunity to use
private information on the relative prospects of the parent and the subsidiary.
4.5 Splitoffs
A splitoff is similar to a spinoff in that the subsidiary becomes an independent company with
a separate stock listing. The splitoff, however, involves an exchange offer, where shareholders
are offered to exchange parent company stock for subsidiary stock. Thus, the splitoff effectively
resembles a stock repurchase, where the parent company buys back its own shares using subsidiary
stock as consideration. As a result of the exchange offer, the ownership structure in the parent
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and the subsidiary are different post-splitoff (depending on the extent to which parent shareholders
participate in the exchange offer). Similar to a spinoff, a splitoff does not generate any new cash
to the parent company. The tax treatment is also the same as for a spinoff.
Splitoffs are rare, partly because the valuation of the subsidiary stock is critical for the exchange
offer. A splitoff is therefore always preceded by an equity carveout, which helps establish the market
value of the subsidiary stock. High-profile splitoffs include McDonald’s splitoff of 51% of its interest
in Chipotle Mexican Grill, announced in April 2006 and valued at $660 million; Viacom’s splitoff
of Blockbuster in 2004; and General Motors splitoff of Hughes Electronics in 2003. In May 2011,
Cargill Inc. completed a splitoff worth $14.9 billion of its majority stake in Mosaic Co. Furthermore,
Liberty Media Corp. (former Liberty CapStarz Inc.) was split off from Liberty Interactive Corp.
in September 2011.
We are unaware of any systematic empirical evidence on splitoffs—reflecting the limited number
of transactions.10 Given the similarity with spinoffs, the research on spinoffs is likely relevant for
splitoffs as well. In addition, there may be some value created in splitoffs from the repurchase of
parent stock, for example by signaling that the parent stock is undervalued (Kalay and Lemmon,
2008).
5 Equity carveouts
An equity carveout is an initial public offering (IPO) of a fraction of the stock in a subsidiary. The
subsidiary gets its own management team and a separate board of directors. It becomes subject to
all financial and other reporting requirements of public companies, such as 10-K reports and proxy
statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).11
The parent company often retains a controlling interest, creating a public minority interest in
the subsidiary. There are several reasons for the retention of a majority ownership of the voting
rights: Retention of at least 80% allows consolidation for tax purposes and the opportunity to
subsequently undertake a tax free spinoff, while retention of 50% or more permits consolidation for
accounting purposes. Allen and McConnell (1998) show that parent firms on average retains 69%
10For a case study, see E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company: the Conoco split-off (A), HBS 9-202-005.
11See Hand and Skantz (1998) for an analysis of the accounting choice for equity carveouts under SAB 51. Allen
(1998) describes the equity carveout strategy of Thermo Electron, which carved out 11 subsidiaries during 1983–1995.
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(median 80%) of the subsidiary’s shares, while Vijh (2002) reports a median parent ownership of
72%. Of course, since the subsidiary becomes a publicly traded company of its own, the carveout
does reduce the parent’s control over its former wholly-owned subsidiary.
The shares offered in the IPO may be sold either by the subsidiary itself (a primary issue) or by
the parent company (a secondary issue). A primary issue has no tax consequence, while a secondary
issue is taxable to the parent as a capital gain. Because of this difference in tax treatment, the
majority of equity carveouts are primary issues. The parent company may leave the proceeds from
the IPO in the subsidiary or require that they are paid out to the parent. To minimize taxes,
the proceeds are streamed back to the parent typically using the following procedure: (i) prior to
the carveout, the subsidiary issues a tax-free dividend to the parent in the form of a note (debt
obligation); (ii) after the carveout, the proceeds from the IPO are used to repay the note.
5.1 Transaction volume
Panel B of Figure 2 shows the annual distribution of equity carveout announcements worldwide
from 1985 to 2012, using data from SDC. The carveout volume peaked in the first half of the 1990s,
both in numbers and dollar values. The total market value of subsidiary IPOs reached $80 billion
in 1993 and there was over 500 announced equity carveout transactions in 1994. The turn of the
century saw a second surge in the dollar volume of carveouts ($70 billion in 1999), however, without
a corresponding increase in the number of transactions. In recent years, only a handful of equity
carveout transactions have been announced each year.
Since the mid 1990s, most carveouts have taken place outside the United States. The way
SDC classifies carveouts, this transaction category also contains subsidiaries carved out by the
government (state privatizations). The largest equity carveout in 2012 was the listing of the food
processing company Ninh Hoa Sugar on the HCM City Stock Exchange, Vietnam ($ 1.8 billion).
5.2 Valuation effects
Equity carveouts are viewed favorably by the market. Table 3 shows the parent cumulative ab-
normal announcement stock return for ten selected studies of equity carveouts over the period
1965–2007. The average announcement return is positive and significant across all samples, rang-
ing from 0.5% to 2.7%. The sample-size-weighted average is 1.8% for the total of 1,251 cases. The
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lowest average announcement returns of 0.5% are found in a sample of 136 Taiwanese firms (Sun
and Shu, 2011). The announcement returns for a sample of 71 German firms average 1.7%, which
is similar to the returns for U.S. firms (Wagner, 2004). Interestingly, the positive returns found for
equity carveouts are in stark contrast to announcements of seasoned equity offerings, upon which
the parent stock price typically falls.12
The average carved out subsidiary across the studies in Table 3 has a market value of about
one-third of that of its parent. As for other breakup transactions, the announcement returns are
found to be increasing in the relative size of the carved out subsidiary (Allen and McConnell, 1998;
Vijh, 2002). Vijh (1999) estimates long-term (three-year) abnormal stock returns for both parent
companies and the carved out subsidiaries, and finds that these are insignificantly different from
zero using a variety of benchmarks. Thus, the value creation from the carveout is captured in the
parent stock price at the time of the announcement.
5.3 Drivers of value creation in equity carveouts
Equity carveouts separate the subsidiary from its parent. After the carveout, transactions between
the two companies must take place at arms length. As a result, many of the sources of value
creation in spinoffs may also create value in carveouts. In addition, the partial control retained
by the parent may allow for further sources of value creation, including wealth transfers from new
equity holders and information about the subsidiary generated by the market.
5.3.1 Increased focus
Vijh (2002) examines a sample of 336 equity carveouts between 1980 and 1997. A majority of the
motives offered for the carveout by the parent company involve lack of fit and focus, and a desire
to restructure the operations. He shows that parents and subsidiaries in carveouts are typically in
different industries, and documents that announcement returns on average are higher for carveouts
of non-related subsidiaries.
The evidence on improvements in operating performance following carveouts is mixed. Hulburt,
Miles, and Woolridge (2002) find that both parents and subsidiaries improve their operating perfor-
mance relative to their industry peers in the year after the carveout. In contrast, Powers (2003) and
12See Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007) for a review of security offerings.
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Boone, Haushalter, and Mikkelson (2003) show that the subsidiary operating performance declines
after the carveout. Interestingly, Boone, Haushalter, and Mikkelson (2003) further find that the
operating performance of the parent company improves only when it has completely divested its
ownership in the subsidiary after four years.
5.3.2 Financing subsidiary growth
Information asymmetries between the firm and outside investors tend to increase the cost of capital
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). Prior to the carveout, outside investors have access to the parent
company’s financial information, with information at the divisional level being less accessible. This
opaqueness may increase the cost of funding divisional-level capital expenditures. Because a public
listing of the subsidiary increases the quality of the financial information available to investors,
Schipper and Smith (1986) suggest that equity carveouts help finance high-growth subsidiaries.
Their data bears this out: in their sample, a frequently stated motive for the carveout is to enable
the subsidiary to finance future growth. They also show that carved out subsidiaries typically have
higher price-earnings ratios than their parents, indicating higher growth rates.13
Chen and Guo (2005) also report that parent firms prefer equity carveouts and divestitures to
spinoffs when revenue growth and book-to-market ratios are high. Vijh (2002) further finds that,
over a subsequent three-year period, both parents and their carved out subsidiaries do a greater
number of seasoned equity offerings than control firms matched by industry and size. In addition,
the capital expenditures of the subsidiaries exceed those of their control firms. Overall, it appears
that equity carveouts are used to increase financing opportunities and reduce financing costs for
high-growth subsidiaries.
Michaely and Shaw (1995) document investment banking fees of 7% for carveouts and 2% for
spinoffs in a sample of 61 carveouts and 30 spinoffs between 1981 and 1988. They attribute the
higher costs of carveouts to the greater scrutiny and more stringent disclosure standard associated
with the continued control by the parent company. They also suggest that, because of the higher
costs, carveouts are more attractive to firms with relatively low leverage that hold high-quality
assets. Consistent with this, they find that larger less-leveraged parents with relatively large and
13Bayar, Chemmanur, and Liu (2011) present a model where equity carve-outs are used to fund new projects when
outsiders are more optimistic than insiders about the project’s cash flows.
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low-risk subsidiaries tend to prefer a carveout to a spinoff.
5.3.3 Wealth transfers and information asymmetries
Carveouts have the potential for transferring wealth to shareholders from other claimholders. For
example, the separation of assets from the parent possibly reduces the cash flow and collateral
available to bondholders. Allen and McConnell (1998) find, however, positive excess bond returns
when firms announce a carveout, thus rejecting the bondholder wealth transfer hypothesis.
Nanda (1991) models an equity carveout using the adverse selection framework of Myers and
Majluf (1984). In equilibrium, only undervalued parents with overvalued subsidiaries perform
carveouts. Thus, carveouts cause a positive announcement effect on average (and there are no
wealth transfers).14 Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro (1995) examine industry rivals of equity carveout
firms. They postulate that the market’s misvaluation may apply to all firms in the industry. For
a sample of 32 carveouts between 1980 and 1991, they show that industry rivals of the carved-out
subsidiaries experience negative announcement returns, consistent with the overvaluation argument.
They also report insignificant abnormal returns to parent-company rivals. However, Hulburt, Miles,
and Woolridge (2002) find negative returns for parent-company rivals as well, using a sample of 185
equity carveout announcements over 1981–1994. They argue this is evidence against the proposition
the parents of carveouts tend to be undervalued.
Vijh (2006) examines the announcement returns to the seasoned equity offering (SEO) of 90
subsidiaries and 37 parents following equity carveouts. He documents negative returns to the
issuer, but insignificant returns to the non-issuer, whether parent or subsidiary. Using a sample of
equity carveouts from 1995-2002, Baltin and Brettel (2007) detect traces of market timing for the
1998-2000 “hot-market” period. Overall, the proposition that equity carveouts are designed to sell
overvalued equity in the subsidiary receives mixed support.
Several studies examine first-day returns when the carved-out subsidiary is listed. Prezas,
Tarimcilar, and Vasudevan (2000) and Hogan and Olson (2004) document lower initial returns
in carveouts than in traditional initial public offerings. See also Benveniste, Fu, Sequin, and Yu
(2008) and Thompson (2010) for evidence on underpricing in initial public offerings of carved out
14By assuming the carveout’s assets in place are sufficiently small relative to those of the parent, Nanda (1991) rules
out the possibility that the parent of the carveout is also overvalued (which would result in a negative announcement
effect of the carveout). Overvalued parents always prefer to issue their own shares.
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subsidiaries, and Lamont and Thaler (2003) for evidence on mispricing between the subsidiary and
parent company following tech stock carveouts.
5.3.4 Follow-on events
Equity carveouts appear to be a temporary organizational form. A majority of equity carveouts
are followed by a subsequent event. In Schipper and Smith (1986), two-thirds of 76 carved out
subsidiaries were later reacquired by the parent (23), divested entirely (17), spunoff (4), or liquidated
(4). Moreover, Klein, Rosenfeld, and Beranek (1991) find that 44 of 52 carveouts (85%) are followed
by a second event: 25 reacquisitions, 17 selloffs and two spinoffs. Divestitures take place sooner
than reacquisitions: three-quarter of the divestitures occur within three years of the carveout,
compared to one-third of the reacquisitions. Also, the likelihood of reacquisition is greater when
the parent retains 80% or more of the subsidiary shares. Desai, Klock, and Mansi (2011) further
show that the reacquisition probability is higher when the parent and subsidiary are linked through
product-market agreements.
Klein, Rosenfeld, and Beranek (1991) argue that an equity carveout may be the first stage in a
divestiture of a subsidiary. As noted above, the listing of subsidiary’s shares reduces informational
asymmetries and expose the subsidiary to the market for corporate control. Perotti and Rossetto
(2007) model equity carveouts as a way for the parent to obtain information from the market on
the value of the subsidiary as an independent entity. While costly, the listing generates information
about the optimal allocation of ownership of the subsidiary. Thus, the carveout improves the
decision to exercise the option to sell or reacquire control, explaining the temporary nature of
carveouts.
Gleason, Madura, and Pennathur (2006) document insignificant announcement returns for
carveouts that are later reacquired. However, Klein, Rosenfeld, and Beranek (1991) show that
parents experience significantly positive announcement returns when the follow-on event is a sell-
off, both at the initial equity carveout and at the subsequent divestiture. Moreover, the probability
of becoming a target is higher for carved-out subsidiaries than for a sample of matched firms
(Hulburt, 2003). Chahine and Goergen (2011) argue that there is more pre-offer publicity in eq-
uity carveouts that are followed by a spinoff in order to attract retail investors and prevent the
emergence of new blocks, which could reduce the value of the subsidiary. Overall, the evidence is
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consistent with equity carveouts creating value by facilitating future corporate control events.
5.4 Agency issues
Allen and McConnell (1998) argue that some managers avoid selling off assets because their com-
pensation (both tangible and intangible) is tied to the size of the assets that they manage. When
the financing of investments requires an asset sale, management prefers to sell a minority stake
in a subsidiary, maintaining assets under control. For a sample of 188 equity carveouts, they find
that parent firms perform relatively poorly prior to initiating a carveout: parents have lower inter-
est coverage ratios, higher leverage, lower operating profitability, and lower return on assets than
their industry rivals. In sum, the sample parents of the carveouts were poor performers and cash
constrained.
Allen and McConnell (1998) also find that the stock market’s reaction to the carveout an-
nouncement is determined by the use of the proceeds. Firms announcing that the proceeds will
be reinvested in the firm experience insignificant announcement returns, while the average CAR
is a significant 7% for firms that will use the proceeds for debt repayment or a dividend. This
suggests that the stock market may be concerned with inefficient investment decisions if the firm
retains the proceeds. Schipper and Smith (1986) provide further evidence on managers’ reluctance
to relinquish control of the subsidiary. They document that, in a majority of cases, the President
or CEO of the carved-out subsidiary is also a parent company manager.
Powers (2003) suggests that managers use their inside information about the subsidiary’s
prospects in determining what fraction of subsidiary shares to sell to the public. He shows that
the subsequent improvement in subsidiary operating performance tend to increase in the size of
the ownership stake retained by the parent. Similarly, Atanasov, Boone, and Haushalter (2005)
show that carved-out subsidiaries tend to have lower operating performance than their peers only
when parents retain less than 50% ownership. Their interpretation is very different, however.
They suggest that parent managers self-select the carveout either to avoid consolidating the sub-
sidiary’s financial results, or to transfer wealth from the minority shareholders in non-consolidated
subsidiaries through intercorporate transactions ex post.
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6 Tracking stocks
Tracking stock—also called targeted stock or letter stock—is a separate class of parent company
common stock whose dividends track the performance of a given division. That is, the holders
of the tracking stock are entitled to the cash flow generated by this division, hence determining
the value of the stock. The diversified company retains its legal form as one consolidated entity,
however, with one and the same board of directors and top management team. There is no legal
separation or transfer of assets, and the parent retains control of the division. As a result, the
voting rights of the tracking stock is in the parent firm and not in the tracked division. These
voting rights typically vary in proportion to the market value of the underlying division, but could
also be fixed at the issue of the tracking stock.
There are several ways to distribute tracking stock. It can be issued to current shareholders
as a dividend or used as payment in an acquisition. The most common way is, however, is to sell
the tracking stock in a public offering, raising cash for the parent firm. Once the tracking stock
is listed, the underlying division files separate financial statements with the SEC. Thus, tracking
stock creates a type of quasi-pure play, where the tracked division files its own financial statements
and has its own stock, while still being part of the diversified firm. Since tracking stock is an issue
of the company’s own stock, it has no tax implications.
6.1 Transaction volume
The first tracking stock was issued by General Motors (GM) in 1984 as part of the payment for
Electronic Data Systems (EDS). The new stock, GM-E, allowed the selling shareholders—most
notably Ross Perot, who continued in a management position—to participate in the upside of
EDS, despite being part of a much larger company going forward. GM issued its second class
of tracking stock, GM-H, in 1985 when acquiring Hughes Aircraft. The next company to issue
tracking stock was USX, separating its steel division from its oil division (Marathon) in 1991.
In total, 32 U.S. companies have issued some 50 different tracking stocks to date, most of them
in the 1990s. The market seems to have lost its appetite for tracking stock since the turn of the
century. The most recent issues of tracking stock include Sprint PCS and CarMax Group in 2001,
and AT&T Wireless and Disney’s Go.Com in 2000. Carolina Group announced an issue in 2002
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that was subsequently withdrawn. Internationally, there has been only a handful tracking stock
issues, including Sony Communication Network in 2001 (Japan) and Alcatel Optronics (France) in
2000.
6.2 Valuation effects
Announcements of tracking stock are received positively by the market. D’Souza and Jacob (2000)
document an average abnormal two-day announcement return of 3.7% for 37 tracking stocks issued
by 14 U.S. companies between 1984 and 1999. Billett and Mauer (2000), Elder and Westra (2000),
Chemmanur and Paeglis (2001), and Harper and Madura (2002) also report positive tracking stock
announcement ACARs of 2 to 3%. Notice, however, that, given the limited number of tracking
stock issues, these studies use largely the same data.
The evidence on the long-run performance of tracking stock is inconclusive. Examining 19
firms issuing tracking stock, Chemmanur and Paeglis (2001) find that the stock of parent firms
underperform industry indexes over a subsequent three-year period, while the average subsidiary
outperforms its industry index. In contrast, Billett and Vijh (2004) document negative buy-and-
hold returns for subsidiaries, but insignificant long-term excess returns for parents. Clayton and
Qian (2004) further report insignificant long-run stock performance for tracking stock issuers. As
discussed below, however, the strongest testament to a poor performance of tracking stock is the
fact that they have almost entirely disappeared from the marketplace.
6.3 Drivers of value creation in tracking stock
A tracking stock is akin to a ”quasi-pure play.” On the one hand, tracking stock allows the firm to
retain its internal capital market, file a joint tax return, and share certain fixed costs and resources
(Billett and Mauer, 2000; Danielova, 2008). On the other hand, the requirement to file separate
financial statements with the SEC provides some degree of separation between a division and its
parent. Also, the tracking stock makes it possible to give stock-based compensation to subsidiary
managers.
Clayton and Qian (2004) examine whether the separate listings increase the demand for the
parent and subsidiary stocks. They document an ex-date abnormal return of 3% for the parent
company, suggesting that the quasi pure-play created by the tracking stock increases investor
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interest in the firm. However, Elder, Jain, and Kim (2005) fail to find any increase in the liquidity
of the parent firm after the tracking stock issue. Instead, firms issuing tracking stock have relatively
low stock-market liquidity and greater bid-ask spreads than comparable control firms. Overall,
the evidence is inconclusive as to whether tracking stock increases investor demand to hold the
diversified firm.
Logue, Seward, and Walsh (1996) argue that tracking stock is most useful for firms where
the benefits of consolidation and integration outweigh the benefits from a complete separation.
However, it is questionable whether tracking stock separates the divisions sufficiently to successfully
create a pure-play stock. Not surprisingly, D’Souza and Jacob (2000) show that the returns of
tracking stocks are more highly correlated with other common stocks of the same company than
with other firms in the same four-digit SIC industry as the tracked division. We now turn to a
discussion of the major failure of tracking stock.
6.4 Agency issues
Under U.S. corporate law, the board of directors has full discretion to transfer assets between wholly
owned divisions (within any limits set by debt covenants). The assets underlying a tracking stock
therefore lack legal protection from expropriation by the parent company.15 Toward the end of the
1990s, firms issuing tracking stock started to explicitly warn investors of the risk of expropriation.
For example, in its 1999 prospectus for tracking stock in its online broker, Donaldson, Lufkin, &
Jenrette (DLJ) warned of a conflict of interest: ”The board of directors may make decisions that
favor DLJ at the expense of DLJdirect.”
There are several examples of expropriation taking place. When GM in August 1995 announced
its plan to spin off its tracking stock in EDS (GM-E), it first required EDS to make a one-time
contribution of $500 million to the parent (GM). EDS shareholders challenged this payment in
Delaware court—and lost: the court’s decision was that the board of directors has full discretion
to transfer money within the corporation—tracking stock or not. Similarly, before U.S. Steel spun
off the tracking stock in its oil division Marathon in 2001, it first transferred $900 million of debt
to Marathon. Not surprisingly, the stock of the steel division soared 19% on the day of this
15Hass (1996) provides an in-depth discussion of the fiduciary duties of the company’s directors as they relate to
tracking stock.
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announcement.
The poor legal protection of the assets underlying a tracking stock is likely the major reason
for the near-disappearance of this security. In fact, most of the tracking stocks have been reversed
over the last decade. In a press release issued on December 16, 1999, Kerry Hoggard, chairman
of Fletcher Challenge Ltd., said: ”It is clear the the Group’s capital structure is seen as complex
by investors, is perceived to raise governance issues, and has resulted in a significant structural
discount being applied to all our stocks. We cannot allow this to continue, and will move as quickly
as possible to a full dismantling of the target share structure.”
Billett and Vijh (2004) examine 11 announcements to remove the tracking stock structure.
They find significant and positive excess stock returns of 14% to the dismantling announcement.
Tracking stock in its current form may very well be a phenomenon of the past.
7 Leveraged recapitalizations
A leveraged recapitalization (a“recap”) is a significant payout to shareholders financed by new
debt borrowed against the firm’s future cash flow. The company remains publicly traded, but with
a substantially higher debt level. For a sample of 27 firms completing leveraged recaps over the
period 1984–1988, Gupta and Rosenthal (1991) find a threefold increase in the average debt-to-
total-capital ratio, from 22% of to 67%. Denis and Denis (1993) document that the median ratio
of total debt to total assets increases from 45 to 86% for a sample of 39 recaps in 1984–1988.
Moreover, studying 42 leveraged recaps between 1985 and 1989, Handa and Radhakrishnan (1991)
report that the proposed payout averages 60% of the pre-recap market value of equity.
The cash distribution to shareholders is typically structured as a large, special, one-time divi-
dend. Alternatively, the distribution could be in the form of a share repurchase or exchange offer.
Management often forfeits the cash distribution on their shareholdings and instead takes additional
stock. Consequently, leveraged recaps typically result in a substantial increase in managerial equity
ownership. Handa and Radhakrishnan (1991) document that insider equity ownership increases by
three times, while Gupta and Rosenthal (1991) report a doubling of the insider ownership (from
3.8 to 8.4%). In Denis and Denis (1993), the median ownership of officers, directors, and employees
soars from 6 to 15%.
35
Prior to the widespread use of poison pills, leveraged recaps were sometimes used as a defense
against a hostile takeover threat. See Denis (1990) for an analysis of leveraged recapitalizations as
a takeover defense.
A leveraged recapitalization triggers a tax liability at the investor level. The tax depends on
how the payout to shareholders is structured. For a special dividend, the amount distributed from
the firm’s retained earnings is taxed as a dividend. If the special dividend exceeds the retained
earnings on the firm’s balance sheet, the remaining cash distribution is a return of capital, treated
as a capital gain. If the recap is structured as a share repurchase, the entire distribution is taxed
as a capital gain.
The financial accounting for leveraged recapitalizations does not require any step-up of the
company’s assets. As a result, if the new debt exceeds the book value of the firm’s equity, the
company’s book equity becomes negative following the recap. What appears like a leveraged buyout
by a private equity sponsor is sometimes structured as a recap. Recap accounting can be used if
the buyer acquires less than 94.9% of the firm’s stock, and the owners of the minority interest,
which must be widely held, are independent from the buyer.
7.1 Transaction volume
There was a substantial number of large leveraged recapitalizations in the late 1980s, apparently
capitalizing on relatively easy access to high-yield financing (Denis and Denis, 1995).16 Several of
these recapitalizations were made in response to a takeover threat. For example, following a hostile
takeover offer from Limited, Carter Hawley Hale announced plans to make a special payout of $325
million. The payout, which was completed in September 1987, increased the firms total debt to
114% of the book value of the firms assets. In response to a hostile takeover attempt by the Rales
brothers in the fall of 1988, Interco made a special payout of $2.4 billion in cash and securities,
increasing total debt to 157% of the book value of total assets. Other firms making large debt-
increasing dividend payments in 1986-1989 include arms producer Colt Industries, Goodyear Tire
and Rubber, retail food chain Kroger, building product maker Owens Corning, packaging company
Sealed Air, and gypsum board manufacturer USG.
16We do not have access to public data sources systematically identifying leveraged recapitalizations. SDC flags
”recapitalization”, however, this flag does not uniquely identify leveraged recapitalization which is the focus here.
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The economic recession in 1990-1991, combined with regulatory restrictions on investments in
high-yield instruments, and a reduction in new lending by commercial banks, ended the wave of
highly leveraged transactions in the U.S. Also, the large recaps seen in the 1980s did not return
following the revival of the debt markets in the early 2000s.
7.2 Valuation effects
The wealth effects of leveraged recapitalizations are substantial. For a sample of 44 recaps over
1985–1990, Bae and Simet (1998) find a two-day shareholder ACAR of 5.7%. Moreover, Handa
and Radhakrishnan (1991) report an average two-day abnormal return of 5.5%, and Gupta and
Rosenthal (1991) find an average announcement CAR of 5.9%. Moreover, Balachandran, Faff,
and Nguyen (2004) document a three-day average CAR of 4.4% for a sample of 167 leveraged
recapitalizations in Australia between 1989 and 2002.
Since the leveraged recapitalization may be a response to a corporate control threat, several
studies measure the returns over a longer event window. Denis and Denis (1993) use a window
starting 40 days prior to initiation, defined as the first indication of a takeover or the announcement
of the recap, through completion of the recap. They estimate an average abnormal return of 32%
(median 26%). Kaplan and Stein (1990) compute the cumulative abnormal stock return starting 40
days prior to the recap announcement, or the day of a hostile bid if there is one, through the recap
completion. They find an average CAR of 45% (median 47%) for 12 leveraged recapitalizations
between 1985 and 1988.
Kaplan and Stein (1990) further estimate the change in systematic risk of the firm’s securities
after the leveraged recap. The increase in the equity risk is relatively modest. Using daily returns
and market-model estimates, the average equity beta increases by 37% from 1.01 to 1.38 after the
recapitalization. They then make two different assumptions about the change in total asset risk
from the transaction. Assuming that the systematic risk of the assets (asset beta) is constant,
the implied debt beta averages 0.65. However, when they assume that the entire market-adjusted
premium represents a reduction in fixed costs, the implied debt beta averages 0.40. Overall, lever-
aged recapitalizations generate substantial shareholder wealth and appears to be associated with a
surprisingly small increase in equity systematic risk.
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7.3 Drivers of value creation in leveraged recapitalizations
As discussed earlier, the high debt in leveraged recapitalizations reduces the firm’s free cash flow and
hence managerial discretion over the investment decisions (Jensen, 1986). Denis and Denis (1993)
examine the change in operating performance and investments for 29 completed recapitalizations
between 1984 and 1988. They document large decreases in the undistributed cash flow (median
-31%) and capital expenditures (median -35%), despite improvements in operating performance
(median 21%) from the year prior to the year after the recap. Also, the post-recap cash flow
covers only two-thirds of the pre-recap capital expenditures, forcing a reduction in the level of
investments. They further examine the market reaction for capital expenditure announcements
and find a significantly negative ACAR over the five-year period prior to the recapitalization,
suggesting a past pattern of overinvestment. Following the recap, the average number of announced
investments drops from 1.2 to 0.3 per firm and year, with an average stock market reaction that
is insignificantly different from zero. They conclude that the increased debt plays a central role in
disciplining managers’ investment decisions.
Consistent with these results, Wruck (1994) documents organizational and compensation changes
in Sealed Air following its leveraged recapitalization in 1989. She suggests that the financial lever-
age was used as a tool to improve the internal control systems, which together with the high debt
service created an environment that led to enormous performance improvements and value creation.
Peyer and Shivdasani (2001) study the efficiency of the internal allocation of investments after
leveraged recapitalizations in 22 multidivisional firms between 1982 and 1994. Prior to the recap,
companies allocate investments to high q divisions. Following the recap, however, investments
become less sensitive to division q and more sensitive to division cash flow. While this may indicate
that the internal allocation of capital becomes less efficient, the total level of capital expenditure
declines, as does the firm’s diversification discount. Peyer and Shivdasani (2001) conclude that
the costs of distorted divisional investments are outweighed by the benefits of lower firm-level
investments. Overall, leveraged recapitalizations appear to create value by curbing managerial
overinvestment and improving operating performance.
Walker (1998) suggests that the benefits from leveraged recapitalizations are transitory, exam-
ining 39 recaps between 1985 and 1989. He finds that the recap firms have higher free cash flow
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prior to the recap than matching firms. However, the pre-recap level of capital expenditures is not
significantly different from that of its peers. Moreover, operating performance increases from year
-1 to +1 relative to the special dividend but reverts in the subsequent years.
A leveraged recapitalization could be used to signal management’s private information about the
future cash flow of the firm. Healy and Palepu (1995) describe how managers at CUC International
successfully undertook a leveraged recap in 1989 to communicate their optimistic beliefs about the
firm’s future cash flows to investors. Balachandran, Faff, and Nguyen (2004) examine if the positive
information conveyed by a recap extends to other firms in the industry. They find insignificant
stock returns for competitors of firms announcing a leveraged recapitalization, suggesting that the
content of any new information is unique to the recap firm.
A large fraction of the leveraged recapitalizations in the late 1980s subsequently failed. Denis
and Denis (1995) report that 9 (one-third) of 27 firms completing a leveraged recap between 1985
and 1988 became financially distressed. They find that the poor operating performance of the nine
distressed firms is in line with that of their industry peers. Moreover, the stock market reacts
negatively to announcements of asset sales, as well as to economic and regulatory events associated
with the demise of the high-yield market. They conclude that the incidence of distress is not
related to poorly structured transactions, but rather to unexpected macroeconomic and regulatory
developments.
8 Leveraged buyouts (LBOs)
A leveraged buyout is the acquisition of an entire company or a division, financed largely with
debt. The buyer is typically a private equity fund—or in large deals sometimes a consortium of
funds—managed by an LBO sponsor. The target firm thus becomes a private company after the
takeover. The sponsor raises debt to finance the majority of the purchase price and makes an
equity investment from the fund. The equity is injected into a shell company, which simultaneously
borrows the debt and acquires the target. Management is often required to contribute with a
fraction of the equity investment.
The sponsor relies on the cash flow generated by the target company to service the debt, which
is paid off as fast as possible. Sometimes asset sales are used to help amortize the debt. The sponsor
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monitors firm performance closely, focusing on cash flow and return on investment measures. The
objective is to improve the portfolio company’s operating efficiency and grow its revenues for a 3-5
year period before divesting the firm. LBO sponsors try to time the market and exit the investment
when market conditions are favorable. The exit may be through an IPO, a sale to a strategic buyer,
or a sale to another LBO fund. While an IPO typically generates a higher valuation, the drawback
is that it usually takes several years for the LBO fund to entirely unwind its holdings through the
public markets.
Because of the heavy debt load, a target firm is traditionally characterized by a strong pre-
dictable cash flow, supported by a history of profitability. In addition, it is often in a mature
industry, with low growth and limited need for additional capital expenditures. The industry scope
of leveraged buyouts has increased over time, however, as has the importance of international deals.
Also, while the conventional LBO involves a publicly traded target company, a majority of leveraged
buyout transactions involve a privately held target firm.
A management buyout (MBO) is a leveraged buyout of a segment, a division or a subsidiary of
a large corporation and in which key corporate executives play a critical role. MBOs are generally
smaller than traditional LBOs and, depending on the size of the transaction, a sponsor need not be
involved. In the following, MBOs are singled out only if this term is explicitly used to characterize
a sample.
8.1 Transaction volume
The leverage buyout activity varies considerably over time. Figure 3 shows the total deal value
and number of LBOs announced globally between 1985 and 2012, using data from SDC. A first
surge in the LBO activity occurred in the late 1980s and took place primarily in the U.S. This
is when landmark transactions such as KKR’s buyouts of RJR Nabisco (worth $25 billion) and
Safeway ($4 billion) took place. This first wave of highly leveraged public buyouts in the U.S.
ended abruptly with the economic recession in 1990-1991, combined with the bankruptcy of Drexel
Burnham Lambert, regulatory restrictions on high-yield investments, and reduced lending by by
commercial banks.
The number of non-U.S. buyouts grew steadily through the 1990s, when most of the transac-
tions involved private companies and divisions. As large amounts of debt financing became easily
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available in the mid-2000s, the public-to-private transaction reappeared in a second buyout boom.
The total value of LBO transactions announced worldwide exceeded $700 billion in both 2006 and
2007. Indeed, in 2006, 19% of the total M&A volume globally came from LBO activity, compared
to an annual average of 8% over the period 2001-2012.
Large U.S. buyouts during this second wave include the acquisitions of Equity Office Properties
($41 billion), hospital chain HCA ($33 billion), Texas energy giant TXU ($32 billion), the world’s
largest casino company Harrah’s Entertainment ($28 billion), media company Clear Channel Com-
munications ($27 billion), payment processer First Data ($26 billion), student-loan provider SLM
($26 billion), pipeline operator Kinder Morgan ($22 billion) and Hilton Hotels ($20 billion), to
mention a few. Large buyouts announced outside the United States in 2006-2007 include Cana-
dian telephone company BCE ($51 billion), British pharmacy-led health and beauty group Alliance
Boots ($22 billion), U.K. airport operator BAA ($22 billion), Spanish cigarette producer Altadis
($18 billion), U.K. utility group Thames Water ($15 billion), and Japanese mobile phone company
Vodafone KK ($14 billion).
With the bankruptcies of Freddie Mac and Fannie May in 2007, debt financing for large trans-
actions dried up and put a stop to the mega deals. Over the next couple of years, only a limited
number of large, brandname buyouts was undertaken. After relatively low deal volumes in 2008
and 2009, however, the LBO transaction volume has recovered.
In 2012, a total of 1,729 deals worth $151 billion were announced, reflecting a relatively small
deal size: the average size of deals announced in 2012 was $87 million compared to an average
annual deal size of $130 million over the period 1980-2012. The largest U.S. LBOs announced in
2012 include the Houston pipeline company EP Energy ($7.1 billion), a management-led buyout
of the cable operator Cequel Communications ($6.6 billion), and Carlyle Group’s acquisition of
DuPont’s car paint unit ($4.9 billion). The largest non-U.S. LBO deals in 2012 include U.K.
housing group Annington Homes ($5.1 billion), Shanghai-based advertising company Focus Media
Holding ($3.6 billion), and Swedish tool maker Ahlsell ($2.4 billion).
2013 has started strong with a higher LBO volume in the first four months than that in 2012.
With the announcement of leveraged buyouts of computer technology giant Dell ($24.4 billion) and
ketchup maker H.J. Heinz ($23.5 billion), it appears that the mega deals may be on their way back.
Stromberg (2008) estimates the value of firms acquired in leveraged buyouts between 1970 and
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2007 to be a total of $3.6 trillion, three-quarters of which represents LBOs undertaken after year
2000. This second wave of large LBOs has spurred a renewed interest for leveraged buyouts in
academic research—something this survey is benefiting from.
8.2 The LBO capital structure
An LBO is financed with a mix of bank loans, high yield debt, mezzanine debt, and private equity.
The pieces differ in many ways: the sources of capital; the ranking in the capital structure; the
structure of the coupon or dividend; callability and prepayment; maturity and amortization; fees
to underwriters; covenants and legal restrictions; and marketing and the capital raising process.
In the following, we describe the main features of the different pieces in the LBO firm’s capital
structure.
8.2.1 The LBO debt
The bank debt, referred to as leveraged loans, is secured and most senior in the capital structure.
The proportion leveraged loans in the LBO firm’s capital structure varies, but was around 40% for
U.S. buyouts closed in 2006-2007, and closer to 45% in more recent transactions.
Leveraged loans are sold via a syndication memorandum (the “bank book”) and are committed
at the time of the transaction. Underwriter fees range from 1.5% to 2.5%. While the maturity varies
with the firm’s credit profile, it is commonly 5-8 years and always shorter than that of junior debt.
The bank debt has to be amortized before any other claimholders are paid off. A unique feature
of the bank debt is that it can be prepaid at par at any time without a penalty. Loan covenants
require the firm to maintain certain financial ratios, and often include cash sweeps, requiring the
firm to use any excess cash flow for accelerated amortization of the bank loans.17
Panel A of Figure 4 shows the annual volume of U.S. sponsored leveraged loans from 1997 to
2012, using data from Standard & Poor’s (S&P) LCD. The leveraged loan issuance volume took
off with the second buyout wave and peaked in 2007 at $565 billion. The halt in LBO activity
through the financial crises led to a record low leveraged loan issuance volume of only $38 billion
in 2009. The leveraged loan market has since recovered, with a U.S. sponsored issuance volume of
$285 billion in 2012.
17During the lax credit markets in 2006-2007, many lenders waived the cash sweep requirement.
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Panel B of Figure 4 shows the annual leveraged loans issuance volume for the U.S. and Europe
in 2006-2012. European corporations have traditionally relied more on bank financing than their
U.S. peers. While the leveraged loans issuance volume in Europe was roughly half of that in the
U.S. in the 2006-2009 period, it has failed to keep up with the growth in the U.S. issuance volume
starting in 2010. As a result, in 2012, the leveraged loans issuance volume in Europe was a mere
$37 billion, compared to the $285 billion of leveraged loans issued in the U.S. In fact, the U.S. total
issuance volume of leveraged loans is approaching that of high yield debt, discussed below.
The bank debt is typically structured into several tranches of term loans (A, B, C, and D),
where the holders of Tranche A also pro-rata provides a revolving credit facility. Term-loan A (the
pro rata tranche) is sold to commercial banks, is senior to the other tranches and has a maturity of
5-6 years. Tranches B, C, and D (the institutional tranches) have minimal front-end amortization
and somewhat longer maturity (6-8 years). The institutional tranches are sold to collateralized loan
obligations (CLO), loan participation mutual funds, hedge funds, high-yield bond funds, pensions
funds, insurance companies, and other proprietary investors. CLOs are special-purpose vehicles that
pool a large number of leveraged loans, financed with several tranches of debt sold to institutional
investors.
The leveraged loans are usually rated BB to B+ at issue. The interest rate is floating, quoted as
a spread above the London Interbank Offering Rate (LIBOR). The spread varies depending on the
credit market conditions, seniority, and firm characteristics.18 Figure 5 shows the quarterly spread
above LIBOR for new-issue BB/BB- leveraged loans between the 4th quarter of 1998 and the 2nd
quarter of 2012 (source: S&P’s LCD). As shown in the graph, interest spreads were around 160
basis points in 2005-2007 and higher when credit market conditions are less favorable. While the
institutional tranches have a slightly higher spread than the pro-rata tranche, the spread difference
generally decreases when credit spreads are low.
The remaining debt is raised from the subordinated debt markets. High yield debt is subor-
dinated to the bank debt and mostly unsecured. Interest is fixed, based on a spread to treasury
bonds that varies with credit quality, and expressed as a coupon. At issue, the high yield debt is
rated below investment grade, ranging from B+ to CCC+. This debt has a bullet maturity in 10
years, and is as a rule callable at a premium after a non-callable five-year period (“10NC5”).
18As discussed below, there is also evidence that portfolio companies of brand name sponsors get lower spreads.
43
In the U.S., the high yield debt is often sold to a select group of investors in a 144A offering. Rule
144A of the U.S. Securities Act of 1933 provides a safe harbor from the registration requirements
when the issue is offered to qualified institutional investors (QIB) that own at least $100 million
in investable assets. High-yield investors demand liquidity in an issue, which has typically meant
a minimum of issuance size $150-200 million. Fees to underwriters are higher than for bank debt,
and are in the range of 2.0%-3.5% of the amount issued. Selling high yield bonds requires a road
show and hence a bond issue takes time to close. It is therefore common practice to finance the
high yield portion through a bridge loan at deal closing, repaid within a year with the proceeds
from the subsequent bond issue.
Panel A of Figure 6 shows the annual volume of high yield debt issuance in the U.S. from 1995
to 2012 (source: S&P’s LCD). Interestingly, the high yield debt markets recovered quickly after the
financial crises and reached in 2012 a record high issuance volume of $346 billion. Panel B shows
the time series of the issuance volume of high yield debt for the U.S. and Europe in 2006-2012. The
relative importance of high yield debt financing is much smaller in Europe than in the U.S. Over
the 2006-2012 period, the European high yield debt issuance volume was roughly 20% of that in
the U.S.
As an alternative to high yield debt, which is publicly traded, the market for second lien loans
took off in 2003. These loans are privately placed with hedge funds and CLO investors, and are
secured in the firm’s assets but subordinated to the bank loans. In 2007, the total volume of second
lien loans issued in the U.S. reached $30 billion (source: S&P’s LCD). As shown in Panel A of
Figure 7, the second lien loan market almost disappeared when the debt markets shut down in
2007, and has since remained a niche market. In 2012, the U.S. issue volume of second lien loans
was a mere $6.8 billion. Second lien loans are typically callable immediately, often for a small
premium of 1%-3%.
Panel B of Figure 7 shows annual average debt multiples, defined as the pro forma ratio of
total debt to adjusted EBITDA, in LBO transactions between 1997 and the second quarter of 2012
(source: S&P’s LCD). Debt multiples were at a historical low in 2001 after the burst of the internet
bubble, with the average LBO firm raising debt of 3.5 times EBITDA. The expansion of the debt
markets and aggressive lending practices over the following five-year period resulted in an average
debt multiple of 6.1 times EBITDA in 2007. After the financing market turmoil in mid-2007,
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however, debt multiples fell to a low of 3.7 in 2009. Since 2010, lending has again eased up, and
the average debt multiple was 5.3 times EBITDA in the first six months of 2012.
In periods when the access to high yield debt and leveraged loans are limited, sponsors resort
to mezzanine financing. The mezzanine debt replaces or is subordinated to the high yield bonds,
with tranches that are often too small for a high-yield issue (i.e. below $150 million). It is sold
in a private placement, thus avoiding public filing requirements and roadshow. U.S. mezzanine
investors are typically insurance companies and mezzanine funds.
The mezzanine debt is a committed financing with individually negotiated terms. It is struc-
tured as a debt contract or preferred equity, with warrants and other “equity kickers” attached to
increase its total returns. All or part of the interest expense or dividend is often in the form of
additional securities rather than cash, so called pay-in-kind (PIK).
Figure 8 shows the annual issuance of leveraged loans, high-yield debt and mezzanine debt in
Europe, 2006-2012 (source: European Mezzanine Review and S&P’s LCD). Banks have historically
played a much more important corporate funding role in Europe than in the U.S., where the public
capital markets provide three-quarters of all corporate debt. A European bank would typically
underwrite and syndicate both a senior secured loan and the subordinated mezzanine tranche,
secured with a second lien.
However, as shown in the figure, banks in Europe have been pulling back on extending credit.
Leveraged loans issuance has fallen from a peak of EUR 166 billion in 2007 to EUR 29 billion in
2012, and the role of banks in underwriting and syndicating mezzanine tranches has been negligible
since 2009. This drop has been in part offset by an increase in European high-yield debt issuance
over the last decade. Overall, European below-investment grade debt markets are starting to look
more like those in the U.S.—relying more on capital markets debt issuance (high-yield bonds) and
less on bank lending (leveraged loans and mezzanine financing).
8.2.2 The LBO equity and sponsor compensation
The private equity is the most junior in the capital structure. It typically has voting rights, but
no dividends. This equity is raised in the “alternative investments” market from pension funds,
endowments, insurance companies, wealthy individuals, investment banks, and “fund-of-funds”
into a fund managed by a private equity partnership (the sponsor). These alternative investments
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represent between 3% and 10% of the investors’ total portfolio holdings. The capital is raised into
a private equity fund managed by an LBO sponsor. Prominent LBO sponsors include Blackstone,
Carlyle, and KKR. Panel A in Figure 9 shows the capital raised globally for private equity from
1997 to 2nd quarter of 2012 (source: Preqin).
Capital raised for private equity funds with final close peaked in 2007 and 2008 with $664
billion and $679 billion, respectively. As shown in the graph, the fund raising environment for
private equity was more difficult in the years following the financial crises. In the first half of 2012,
however, private equity funds raised a total of $252 billion, close to the $306 billion raised in 2013.
The equity is committed, but not paid in until called by the LBO sponsor, typically with a two
weeks’ notice.
Most sponsors are paid a management fee of 2% on the fund’s capital and receive a carried
interest of 20% of the profits above a certain benchmark realized by the fund. In addition, many
sponsors charge transaction fees and annual monitoring fees to their portfolio companies. For a
sample of 6,000 investments made by buyout funds in 1971–2007 in 30 countries, Phalippou (2009)
estimates that the average fund charges fees of seven percent per year. He suggests that investors
underestimate the impact of fees because the fee contracts are opaque. See Metrick and Yasuda
(2010) and Choi, Metrick, and Yasuda (2011) for a detailed description and analysis of the fee
structure in LBO funds.
Current fund performance may also have implications for the ability of the general partners to
raise buyout capital in the future. Chung, Sensoy, Stern, and Weisbach (2010) present a model
which introduces implicit incentives from future fundraising. For a typical first-time fund, they
estimate the size of such implicit incentives to be of equal magnitude as the carried interest in the
current fund. Accounting for the incentive to fundraise makes the performance-sensitive component
of general partner revenue much larger.
Robinson and Sensoy (2011b) investigate the determinants of fund managers’ compensation in
a mixed sample of 837 buyout and venture capital funds in 1984–2010. The median management
fee is 2%, a carry of 20% is the norm, and the median general partner is required to coinvest 1% of
the fund’s size, corresponding to a $3.6 billion investment in the typical buyout fund. Controlling
for fund size, management fees tend to increase during fundraising booms. Management fees are
generally lower in larger funds, while carried interest is higher. Importantly, there is no evidence of
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a lower net-of-fee performance for higher-fee funds or funds with a relatively low sponsor coinvest-
ment. In other words, sponsor compensation is largely unrelated to the net cash flow performance.
The authors suggest that their evidence is consistent with more skilled general partners earning
higher compensation by generating higher gross performance.
Panel A of Figure 10 shows the average equity contribution in LBOs from 1987 through 2nd
quarter of 2012 (source: Portfolio Management Data). The deals at the end of the 1980s were
extremely highly leveraged, with an average equity portion of 8-10% of the total capital. Since then,
there has been a steadily increasing requirement for equity participation in the buyout transactions.
Over the last decade, most LBO transactions have had a substantially higher fraction of equity
financing, with equity constituting on average between 40% and 50% percent of the capital structure
in recent years.
Managers are generally required to co-invest in the buyout equity along with the LBO fund. If
a manager has been involved in a prior buyout, she is asked to roll over a portion of her equity in
the target firm. If it is a first-time LBO, managers may be offered to buy equity at a discount, or
receive additional stock and options conditional on certain performance goals.
8.2.3 Price multiples and LBO debt levels
Price and debt levels in LBOs vary substantially across times. Panel B of Figure 10 shows the
average price multiple in LBOs, defined as the ratio of the purchase price to trailing EBITDA, for
the period 1997–2nd quarter 2012. The source is Standard & Poor’s LCD. Average prices rose from
a low average multiple of 6.0 in 2001 to a high of 9.7 in 2007. In the first half of 2012, average
purchase multiples were still relatively high at 8.1 times trailing EBITDA. The total funds raised
in the buyout transaction are used for the consideration to the seller as well as underwriter fees for
the LBO debt and call premiums on existing bonds.
The price multiples in LBOs seem to be driven more by the availability of debt financing than
the general market conditions. Axelson, Jenkinson, Stromberg, and Weisbach (2010) investigate
the determinants of LBO firms’ financial structure for a sample of 1,157 worldwide leveraged buyout
deals in 1980–2008. They find that the leverage of LBO firms is unrelated to debt levels of similar
public firms. Instead, market-wide credit conditions, measured as the leveraged loan spread over
LIBOR, is the main driver of both the quantity and composition of debt of the LBO firms.
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Transaction price multiples are positively related to price multiples in public markets, but also
to declines in loan spreads. Interestingly, the use of high leverage in the transactions is negatively
related to fund returns, after controlling for vintage and a variety of other characteristics. Axelson,
Jenkinson, Stromberg, and Weisbach (2010) suggest that agency problems between private equity
fund managers and their investors allow credit conditions to drive the use of leverage, which create
a pro-cyclical pattern in leveraged buyout activity and at times may hurt investment performance.
Colla and Wagner (2011) also analyze LBO firms’ capital structure for a worldwide sample of 238
buyouts in 1997-2008. While Axelson, Jenkinson, Stromberg, and Weisbach (2010) rely on matched
public firms, the data of Colla and Wagner (2011) includes firm-specific characteristics. Consistent
with prior evidence on public firms, they find that leverage increases with firm profitability and
decreases with cash flow volatility. Furthermore, in hot buyout markets, senior lenders become
more aggressive, loosening lending conditions and crowding out junior debt.
Shivdasani and Wang (2011) show that the increased bank lending in 2004-2007 was made
possible by securitization, which altered banks’ access to capital. Banks lending to LBO firms were
also active in underwriting CLOs, often used to securitize these loans. Loans offered by originating
banks had lower spreads and looser covenant protection. Also, LBO deals funded by these banks
relied more on bank debt than deals funded by other banks. Although financing costs were lower,
there is little evidence that CLOs were used to fund lower-quality deals. Target firms in CLO
driven deals generated more free cash flows and were substantially larger than other deals. Thus, it
appears that a primary impact of the CLO channel of funding was to facilitate the financing of much
larger LBOs. See also Roden and Lewellen (1995) for further empirical analysis of the structure of
the LBO financing package and Axelson, Stromberg, and Weisbach (2009) for a theoretical model
explaining the financial structure of buyout firms.
Haddad, Loualiche, and Plosser (2011) introduce the possibility of time variation in investors’
discount rates, which alter the value of agency costs plaguing the public firm. They identify 756
buyout transactions in a quarterly panel of public firms from 1980 to 2009. Using pooled probit
regressions, they find that the likelihood of a firm going private increases in the risk-free rate and
decreases in expected market returns. Interestingly, after controlling for the risk-free rate and
the market risk premia, specific variables capturing credit market conditions cannot predict LBO
activity. In the cross-section, firms with lower market beta, lower non-systematic risk (measured as
48
the standard deviation of the residual from the market model), and lower cash-flow volatility are
more likely to become LBO targets, perhaps because these firms have more capacity for high debt.
See also Cao, Cumming, Qian, and Wang (2010) for a cross-country examination of LBO activity
and creditor rights.
8.3 Value creation in LBOs
The total value created in a leveraged buyout is divided between the selling shareholders and the
LBO investors. Table 4 shows the premiums paid in 1,058 leveraged buyout transactions between
1973 and 2006 as reported by seven selected studies. The premium is defined as the final offer
price in excess of the target stock price 20–60 days prior to the announcement of the bid. As
shown in the table, the average premium ranges from 27% to 59% across the seven studies, with
a sample-size-weighted average of 37%. The median premium ranges from 27% to 42%, with an
average of 32%. It appears that premiums are generally somewhat lower in the 2000s compared to
the 1980s. The exception is the study by Renneboog, Simons, and Wright (2007) of 177 buyouts in
the United Kingdom between 1997 and 2003. They document an average premium of 40% (median
38%), which is higher than the contemporaneous LBO premiums of 27–29% in the United States
(Guo, Hotchkiss, and Song, 2011).
Several studies find two-day average CARs of 16–17% for LBO announcements in the 1980s
(DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice, 1984; Lehn and Poulsen, 1989; Slovin, Sushka, and Bendeck, 1991;
Van de Gucht and Moore, 1998). For a sample of 641 proposed LBOs in 1980–2001, Brown, Fee, and
Thomas (2009) estimate an average announcement CAR of 19%. Studying 115 buyout transactions
in Europe, 1997-2005, Andres, Betzer, and Weir (2007) report a two-day announcement return of
13%. The announcement return reflects a combination of the market’s estimate of the target gains
from a deal and the likelihood that the deal succeeds. In a sample of large corporate asset sales
1994–2004, Hege, Lovo, Slovin, and Sushka (2011) show that sellers have higher announcement
returns when the buyer is a private equity fund rather than a strategic buyer.19 Overall, the target
shareholders tend to make substantial gains in leveraged buyouts.
The second part of the equation is the returns realized by the LBO investors. These returns
19See also Gorbenko and Malenko (2010) for a structural model of takeover auctions with asymmetries in the
valuation of the target across strategic and financial bidders.
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have been difficult to estimate since the buyout targets are taken private and often do not return to
public ownership. Kaplan (1989a) estimates a median market-adjusted return of 28% (mean 42%)
for investors in 25 MBOs that went public after on average 2.7 years. Muscarella and Versuypens
(1990) examine the equity returns for 58 LBO firms that returned to public status after on average
2.9 years. Comparing the IPO price with the LBO price, they estimate an average annualized rate
of raw return of 268%. This return is, however, not significantly different from the return of a
hypothetical levered portfolio of S&P500 firms.
More recently, LBO fund quarterly cash flow has been available through self reporting to Venture
Economics by private equity firms and their limited partners.20 Kaplan and Schoar (2005) use this
data to investigate the returns in 1980–2001 for 169 LBO funds raised before 1996. Net of fees,
the median fund is estimated to underperform the stock market index, generating only 80% (mean
97%) of the return on the S&P500. However, the heterogeneity in performance across funds is
large. For the subset of sponsors that have been around for at least five years, the median net-of-
fee performance exceeds the S&P500 by 50% (mean 80%). Kaplan and Schoar (2005) show that
this performance is persistent, and suggest that LBO sponsors may have different skills in managing
portfolio companies.
Phallipou and Gottschalg (2009) study the same data set through a slightly extended time
period. Specifically, they examine the cash flow data in 1980–2002 for 238 funds raised 1993 or
earlier. Supporting the results in Kaplan and Schoar (2005), total net-of-fee cash distributions
to investors are surprisingly low. The median cash return is 1.6 times the paid-in capital for
U.S. focused funds and 1.2 times paid-in capital for funds focused on buyouts in the European
Union. Phallipou and Gottschalg (2009) further try to correct for the large number of funds
in VentureXpert, an investment oriented database, that are not included in Venture Economics.
After this correction, they estimate an average annual fund alpha of -3% for a combined sample of
buyout and venture funds. That is, assuming a fund beta of one, the average private equity fund
underperforms the S&P500 by as much as 3% per year.
Driessen, Lin, and Phalippou (2011) explore the risk and return characteristics of buyout invest-
ments. They develop a GMM-style methodology to estimate the abnormal performance and risk
exposure of the funds’ net-of-fee distributions. The data set includes the actual cash flows through
20This database is also referred to as Thompson Venture Expert.
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2003 reported in Venture Economics for 272 buyout funds raised in 1980–1993. Their estimations
produce a buyout fund market beta of a low 0.33 and an alpha close to zero. Interestingly, while
fund alpha is unrelated to size, the beta is significantly positively related to size. Thus, the persis-
tently higher return of large funds documented by Kaplan and Schoar (2005) could be explained
by higher risk rather than superior abnormal performance. Using a different mimicking portfolio
technique, Groh and Gottschalg (2011) also document a low beta of buyout funds.
Recent papers cast doubt on the quality of the data in Venture Economics. Stucke (2011) sug-
gests that this data base systematically is missing information on cash distributions and fails to
update residual values, which leads to a downward bias in performance estimations. Harris, Jenk-
inson, and Kaplan (2011) compare fund performance across several different data sets and conclude
that Venture Economics seems to understate the returns for buyout funds. Thus, papers using other
sources of data may provide more reliable information about private equity fund performance.
Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007) examine a hand-collected data set of 321 buyout investments
in the United Kingdom that were exited between 1995 and 2004. They document an average
internal rate of return (IRR) on the equity investment of 70%, adjusted for the return of the FTSE
100 index on the London Stock Exchange. The variation between individual investments are large,
and the median index-adjusted return is -18%. At a fund level, however, the size of each individual
investment matters. Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007) show that, in the cross-section, the larger
investments tend to have higher returns. Thus, their evidence suggests that buyout index-adjusted
fund returns are positive, at least before accounting for sponsor fees. Using proprietary data on
cash inflows and outflows from a large institutional investor invested in 54 U.S. LBO funds raised
between 1981 and 1993, Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) also find positive fund returns. They
report that buyout funds typically outperform the stock market, generating a risk-adjusted excess
return (alpha) of 5% annually.
Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2004) use sponsor estimates of value changes to analyze quarterly
returns of 379 LBO funds formed between 1980 and 1999. Measuring fund performance with a
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, their estimations yield buyout fund alphas that are
insignificantly different from zero. However, Cumming and Walz (2010) caution in interpreting
fund returns based on unrealized valuation estimates. They study whether private equity fund
managers tend to report inflated valuation estimates of portfolio companies that have not yet been
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realized. The sample is large, including cash flow data for over 5,000 portfolio companies of 221
private equity funds across 39 countries in the period 1971–2003, one-quarter of which are buyout
funds. Comparing realized returns with previously reported returns, Cumming and Walz (2010)
show systematic upward biases in the self-reported returns.
Higson and Stucke (2011) examine a large proprietary database of fund cash flows, covering
85% of all funds raised by the U.S. buyout industry. Their evidence indicates that the buyout
industry significantly has outperformed the S&P500. Funds liquidated in the period 1980-2000
generated excess returns of on average 4.5% per year. The cross-sectional variation is large, with
just over 60% of the funds outperforming the stock-market index, and the top decile driving the
positive average returns. Analyzing individual fund data from Burgiss that is self-reported by
limited partners, Harris, Jenkinson, and Kaplan (2011) find that the median and average buyout
fund has outperformed public markets. Moreover, using fund data from a large limited partner,
Robinson and Sensoy (2011a) also document returns exceeding public market indexes for the 1990s
vintage buyout funds.
Finally, Phalippou (2012) explores public data from Preqin, which contains the cash flows for
392 U.S. buyout funds. He finds that these funds outperform the Vanguard S&P500 index fund by
on average 5.7% per annum. However, after adjusting for risk-factors related to the small size of
the portfolio companies, the value premium and leverage, the average annual fund alpha is negative
(-3.1%).
Overall, the total gains from LBOs are large, manifested in the substantial premiums paid to
target shareholders. However, the evidence is inconclusive as to whether selling shareholders largely
capture all the gains in leveraged buyouts. Depending on the sample, the benchmark portfolio, and
assumptions about the value of assets that are not liquidated, the estimates of LBO fund abnormal
returns range from positive to negative.
8.4 Drivers of value creation in LBOs
8.4.1 Operating efficiency
Jensen (1986) argues that entrenched managers prefer to overinvest rather than pay out the firm’s
free cash flow as dividends. Increasing the firm’s debt, without retaining the proceeds, reduces the
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overinvestment problem by precommitting future cash flow to be paid out in the form of interest.
In addition, the increased risk of financial distress helps motivate managers to operate the firm
efficiently. In sum, by limiting managerial discretion, debt reduces the agency costs of free cash
flow.
As argued by Jensen (1986), the high leverage in buyouts may result in improved managerial
investment decisions for firms with high cash flow and few growth opportunities. Lehn and Poulsen
(1989) examine 263 LBOs in the 1980s. They find that firms with high levels of free cash flow are
more likely to go private and that acquisition premiums increase with the target firm’s cash flow.
They conclude that the mitigation of agency problems associated with free cash flow is a major
source of buyout gains. Opler and Titman (1993) provide additional evidence showing that LBO
targets have a combination of high cash flow and unfavorable investment opportunities (low q), and
are more diversified than firms that don’t become targets. Also, Bae and Simet (1998) find that
LBO announcement returns are increasing in the free cash flow of the target firm.
There is some evidence that buyouts are less likely for firms with high expenditures for research
and development (R&D). Long and Ravenscraft (1993) show that LBOs typically target firms with
R&D expenditures below the industry average. Servaes (1994), however, fails to find any significant
difference in the capital expenditure level between target firms in 99 going private transactions and
their industry peers.
Harford and Kolasinski (2011) suggest that private equity sponsors add value by reducing
overinvestment and making financing of investments available in years where public firms are cash
constrained. For a sample of 388 firms bought out with public debt in 1996–2006, they document
greater improvements in portfolio company return on assets than that of public industry peers.
The level of capital expenditures unrelated to investment opportunities, measured by sales growth
and industry market-to-book ratio, decline relative to rivals. Moreover, relative to the control
group, portfolio companies’ capital expenditures are less sensitive to operating losses. Overall, the
evidence suggests that the potential for incentive realignment in firms with high levels of free cash
flow represents an important factor in the leveraged buyout decision.
If leverage successfully curbs overinvestment, this should show in the post-buyout operating
performance. Kaplan (1989a) examines the performance of 48 large management buyouts between
1980 and 1986. He shows that the firms experience substantial increases in operating income
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(+42%), reductions in capital expenditure, and improvements of the net cash flow (+96%) over a
three-year period following the buyout. Smith (1990) also reports significant performance improve-
ments for 58 management buyouts in 1977–1986. She finds that operating returns, measured as
operating cash flow per employee and per dollar of operating assets, increase significantly from the
year prior to the year after the buyout. She examines changes in accounting line items and finds
no evidence that repair and maintenance expenditures are postponed or the R&D expenditures are
reduced. Instead, the higher margins are a result of adjustments in the management of working
capital.
Several other studies document improved operating efficiency after buyouts. Lichtenberg and
Siegel (1990) examine data from the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) of the U.S. Bureau
of the Census for 131 LBOs in the period 1981–1986, with a total of 1,132 plants. They show
that plant total factor productivity (TFP) increases more than the industry average in the years
following a leveraged buyout. Consistent with this, Harris, Siegel, and Wright (2005) find an above-
industry increase in TFP for U.K. MBO plants in the 1990s. Moreover, Muscarella and Versuypens
(1990) examine the performance of 72 LBO firms that went public again. They show that LBO
firms reduce operating costs and experience significant improvements in their operating margins.
Also, while there is a dramatic increase in leverage upon completion of the LBO, the debt ratios
are gradually reduced before returning to public ownership.
The evidence of improvements in operating performance is weaker for more recent transactions.
Guo, Hotchkiss, and Song (2011) examine 192 U.S. public-to-private LBOs between 1990 and 2006,
94 of which have post-transaction data. They find that post-buyout improvements in operating
performance are comparable to or slightly exceed benchmark firms matched on industry and pre-
buyout characteristics. The cash flow improvements are greater for firms with higher increase
in leverage and when the CEO is replaced in the buyout transaction. Moreover, the median risk-
adjusted return to LBO investors are 41% (average 63%). Interestingly, the cash flow improvements
and returns to capital are strongly related. However, due to the small magnitude of the cash flow
gains, Guo, Hotchkiss, and Song (2011) suggest that recent transactions may be motivated by other
considerations than improving the operating efficiency of underperforming firms. Providing further
support for this conjecture, Cohn, Mills, and Towery (2011) find little evidence of improvements in
operating performance after an LBO, using corporate tax return data for 317 U.S. public companies
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that went private between 1995 and 2007. Similarly, for a sample of 35 successful public-to-private
transactions in 1998-2006, Bartlett III and Poulsen (2010) show a reduced focus on improving
portfolio company operating profitability. Instead, buyout funds increasingly seek to increase equity
returns by implementing strategies that aggressively grow revenues and capitalize on favorable
conditions in the capital markets.
However, the evidence suggests that European buyouts still generate improvements in operating
performance. Cressy, Munari, and Malipiero (2007) compare the operating performance of private
equity backed LBOs with that of comparable non-buyout private firms matched on industry and
size. Their sample is 122 U.K. buyouts in 1995–2002. They find a higher post-buyout operating
profitability for the LBO firms, and particularly when the sponsor specializes in the target firm
industry. Acharya, Gottschalg, Hahn, and Kehoe (2011) study 395 leverage buyout transactions in
Western Europe sponsored by large private equity firms during 1997-2001, and compare them to
publicly traded peers. They estimate that 20% in deal IRR, or one-third of the gross IRR of the
portfolio companies, is abnormal performance (adjusted for the higher leverage). During private
equity ownership, the average operating performance increases by 0.4% per annum above industry
median. Also, a stronger operating improvement is associated with higher abnormal IRR and
private equity partners with strong operational background. Boucly, Sraer, and Thesmar (2011)
further document an increase in operating profitability for a large sample of French LBO firms
compared to their controls. This evidence is consistent with private equity sponsors creating value
through operating improvements. See also Achleitner, Braun, and Engel (2011) for further evidence
on multiples and operating performance improvements of buyout firms.
There is a concern that the trimmed organization and reduced capital expenditure may hurt
the long-term prospects of LBO firms. Lerner, Sorensen, and Stromberg (2011) study a sample
of 472 LBO firms that received private equity backing between 1986 and 2005 and filed at least
one successful patent application through May 2007. They show that firms continue to pursue
high-impact patents after going private, concentrating their innovations in areas of historical core
strengths. They conclude that leveraged buyouts promote a beneficial refocusing of the firm’s
patent portfolios. In a different study of 681 private firms in Western Europe that were acquired
by private equity funds in the period 1998–2004, Ughetto (2010) finds an increase in the number of
successful patent applications after the buyout. Moreover, Barrot (2012) examines the impact of
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the horizon of private equity funds on their investment strategies. He finds that funds with longer
remaining investment horizon tend to select younger, earlier-stage firms and hold on to them longer.
Overall, the results suggest that buyout funds target firms with free cash flow, where the lever-
age could help improve investment decisions by reducing managers’ discretionary funds. There is
convincing evidence of post-buyout improvements in operating performance and plant productivity.
Also, while total capital expenditures decline, critical investments in R&D seem to continue.
8.4.2 Employment
It appears that the improvements in operating efficiency are associated with employee layoffs.
Kaplan (1989a) finds that the median firm reduces its employee count by 12% relative to the
industry from the year prior to the year after the buyout. Muscarella and Versuypens (1990) show
that the average employment declines by 0.6% for LBO firms that subsequently went public. This
job creation is in the bottom 10% of COMPUSTAT firms. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) report that
white collar compensation and employment decline in the years following the buyout. Moreover,
for a sample of 33 LBOs in 1980–1984, Liebeskind, Wiersema, and Hansen (1992) report that LBO
firms downsize the operations more than comparable firms in terms of number of employees, plants
and total revenues. In addition, there is some evidence that buyouts in the United Kingdom lead to
modest declines in employment (Wright, Thompson, and Robbie, 1992; Amess and Wright, 2007;
Cressy, Munari, and Malipiero, 2011).
More recent evidence, however, suggests that the decline in LBO employment in existing facili-
ties is outweighed by additional employment in new establishments, defined as new plants, offices,
and retail outlets. Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, Lerner, and Miranda (2011) examine LBD data for
3,200 U.S. firms acquired in private equity transactions between 1980 and 1995 and 150,000 U.S.
establishments operated by these firms. Consistent with previous work, they find that employ-
ment drops more in existing target establishments than at control firm establishments following
the buyout. The difference is 3% of initial employment over two years and 6% over five years.
Also, target-firm employment losses are much greater in public-to-private transactions than other
leveraged buyouts. However, the LBO firms create substantially more jobs in new establishments
than do their peers. They conclude that the private equity sponsors push the target firm to expand
in new, higher-value directions. Overall, while LBO firms appear to trim their workforce to improve
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efficiency in existing production facilities, they also create additional job opportunities through new
establishments.
There is also some evidence that private target firms experience more growth than firms that
were public prior to the leveraged buyout. Examining a sample of 839 French buyouts in 1994–2004,
Boucly, Sraer, and Thesmar (2011) find that employment, assets and sales grow much more rapidly
at portfolio firms than at their control firms. Interestingly, this growth is concentrated to firms that
were private prior to the takeover, and where the seller was an individual or family cashing out.
Since these firms may have been credit constrained prior to the takeover, it appears that private
equity funds help portfolio companies get access to growth capital. This inference is supported
by Chung (2011), who documents positive industry-adjusted growth rates in employment, assets,
sales, and capital expenditures for a large sample of U.K. private-to-private buyouts between 1997
and 2006.
8.4.3 Corporate governance
Highly leveraged transactions lead to increased monitoring by banks and the LBO sponsor, whose
compensation is a direct function of the success of the investment. Jensen (1989) argues that
the combination of active governance by buyout sponsors, high-powered managerial incentives,
and pressure from high leverage, provide a corporate governance system and incentive structure
that is superior to that of public firms with dispersed ownership. He predicts that the LBO
organization eventually will eclipse the traditional, widely held public companies to become the
dominant organizational form. While this has not yet happened, there is little doubt that the LBO
organization carries with it a relatively efficient governance structure.
A central governance characteristic of leveraged buyouts is a meaningful management equity
participation. Kaplan (1989a) shows that the median equity ownership of the top management
team increases from 6% to 23% for 76 MBOs in the 1980s. Moreover, Muscarella and Versuypens
(1990) report that the most highly paid officer owns 18% of the LBO firm’s equity prior to an IPO
exit.
The equity ownership of the top management team is substantial also in more recent samples.
Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) study 45 LBOs from 1996 to 2004. They find a median equity
ownership of 6% for the CEO and 16% for the management team. Nikoskelainen and Wright
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(2007) report an average equity ownership of 37% (median 35%) for 321 U.K. buyouts over the
1995-2004 period. Acharya and Kehoe (2008) examine a sample of 59 large buyouts in the United
Kingdom between 1997 and 2004. They document an equity ownership including options of 3% for
the CEO and 13% for the top management team as a whole. In sum, leveraged buyouts provide
significant equity-based incentives to top management that help align managerial incentives with
shareholders’ interests.21
The concentration of ownership further provides LBO sponsors with a strong incentive to mon-
itor the firm closely. In the model of Edmans (2011), the concentrated ownership induces equity-
holders to learn more about the firm’s cash flow. This protects skilled managers from being fired
when good long-term projects return low short-term earnings, thus increasing investment efficiency.
Baker and Wruck (1990) provides a detailed description of the organizational changes at O.M.
Scott after its leveraged buyout in 1986. The board had five members, of which one was a manager
and three represented the buyout sponsor. All board members owned stock. The board met quar-
terly, and an executive committee monthly. More importantly, one of the private equity partners
served as a liaison between the LBO sponsor and the firm’s managers. The operating partner,
which functioned as an advisor and consultant, spent several weeks at O.M. Scott after the buy-
out closed and was thereafter in telephone contact with the CEO daily. Baker and Wruck (1990)
conclude that the close monitoring by the LBO sponsor, combined with the restrictions imposed
by the high leverage and significant managerial shareholdings and bonus plans, led to a substantial
improvement in O.M. Scott’s operating performance and investment policies. See also Denis (1994)
for an analysis of the organizational changes at Safeway after its leveraged buyout in 1986.
The evidence suggests that LBO sponsors are active monitors also in more recent transactions.
Cornelli and Karakas (2011) examine the board structure for 88 U.K. leveraged buyouts sponsored
by a private equity firm over the 1998-2003 period. They find significant changes in board size and
composition when a firm goes private. Board size generally decreases and the presence of outside
directors is drastically reduced, as they are replaced by individuals employed by the LBO sponsors.
Private equity sponsors have a larger presence on the board in deals where the incumbent CEO
is replaced or it takes more than five years to exit the investment. Thus, it appears that private
21See also Achleitner, Betzer, and Gider (2010) for an analysis of corporate governance motives in German private
equity investments.
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equity sponsors sit on boards primarily when there is a need for their expertise.
Acharya, Kehoe, and Reyner (2009) examine board effectiveness for private equity portfolio
companies compared to that of publicly traded firms, using a sample of 66 U.K. portfolio firms.
They report that 39% of the CEOs and 33% of the CFOs are replaced either before closure or in
the first 100 days of the deal. For a sample of U.S. buyouts in 1990–2006, Gong and Wu (2011) find
that 51% of incumbent CEOs are replaced within two years of the LBO announcement. Surveying
over 4,000 firms worldwide, Bloom, Sadun, and Reenen (2009) show that private-equity backed
firms on average have better management practices than firms with other types of ownership. See
also Masulis and Thomas (2009) for a discussion of the superior corporate governance by private
equity sponsors. In sum, buyout sponsors play an important role through active monitoring of their
portfolio companies.
Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen (2011) analyze how CEO characteristics affect portfolio com-
pany performance. They examine assessments of 224 candidates hired or remaining as CEOs in
private equity transactions in 2000–2006, performed by a firm specialized in assessing top exec-
utives. Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen (2011) identify two main CEO characteristics: (i) the
candidate’s general ability and (2) his communication and interpersonal skills relative to his execu-
tion and resoluteness skills. Performance is measured several ways, including an assessment by the
private equity firm, whether there was a favorable exit, and whether the company received positive
press on its operations or additional financing at higher valuations. In cross-sectional regressions,
subsequent performance is shown to be positively related to the general ability and execution skills
of the buyout CEO.
While the monitoring by LBO sponsors is an important governance mechanism in leveraged
buyouts, managers sometime undertake MBOs without the involvement of a private equity sponsor.
Fidrmuc, Roosenboom, and van Dijk (2008) examine the choice between an MBO and a sponsor-
backed buyout across 129 U.K. leveraged buyouts in 1997–2003 and where management stayed in
control. They find that MBO targets have lower market-to-book ratios, more cash on hand, and
greater managerial ownership. They suggest that managers invite LBO sponsors when they need
help to complete a deal, and conclude that MBOs and sponsor-backed LBOs are complementary
transactions.
Cotter and Peck (2001) analyze how the equity ownership of the LBO firm interacts with the
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structure of the buyout debt. Their sample is 64 LBO firms in 1984–1989, of which a buyout
specialist owns majority control in 40 firms (63%). They find that firms controlled by an LBO
sponsor use less short-term and/or senior bank debt to finance the transaction. Moreover, the LBO
firm’s operating performance increases with the use of senior debt only in deals where no buyout
specialist is involved. They suggest that bank debt, having more restrictive covenants, and debt
with shorter maturity, and thus higher debt service, both help motivate and monitor management
in the absence of an active buyout specialist. See also Grinstein (2006) for an analysis of how the
debt structure is used to commit investors to disciplinary actions against management.
In sum, leveraged buyouts are characterized by powerful corporate governance structures. First,
management owns a substantial portion of the equity. Second, the ownership is concentrated with
an LBO sponsor who actively monitors management. Third, the high leverage puts additional
pressure on generating cash flow. Together, these mechanisms provide compelling incentives for
managers to improve the efficiency of the LBO firm
8.4.4 Wealth transfers from target debtholders
If the pre-buyout bonds lack protective covenants, the LBO firm may issue more senior debt. Bonds
that lack protective covenants become more junior in the capital structure, resulting in a reduction
in the value of those bonds. Thus, it is possible that some of the buyout gains represent wealth
transfers from target firm debtholders. Marais, Schipper, and Smith (1989) examine a sample
of leveraged buyouts between 1974 and 1985. They find positive average CARs for convertible
securities and preferred stock, most of which are redeemed as part of the buyout. A majority of
the non-convertible debt claims remain outstanding without renegotiation after the buyout. This
debt typically lacks covenants restricting additional borrowing with higher seniority and there are
pervasive downgradings of public debt following successful buyout proposals, suggesting bondholder
losses.
Asquith and Wizman (1990) investigate the one-month return for 199 bonds of LBO targets
in the 1980s. They find an average abnormal return of -1% across all bonds. However, these
losses are concentrated to bonds with no covenant protection (mean return of -3%). Bonds with
strong covenant protection have insignificant returns. Overall, the losses to bondholders are small
compared to the total gains accruing to shareholders in the same LBO. Warga and Welch (1993)
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document an average risk-adjusted LBO announcement return of -7% for 36 bonds. The bond
holder losses, however, constitute at most 6% of the shareholder gains. They too conclude that
bondholder expropriation is a minor source of gains in leveraged buyouts.
Billet, Jiang, and Lie (2010) collect information on change-in-control covenants for a sample of
407 U.S. LBO targets, 1980–2006. A change-in-control covenant forces a redemption of the bonds
at a premium in case of a takeover. They find average bondholder abnormal returns of -4.9%,
consistent with earlier studies. However, splitting the sample based on change-in-control covenant
protection, protected bonds experience positive announcement returns of 2.3%, while unprotected
bonds have negative returns of –6.8%. Interestingly, firms without change-in-control covenants are
twice as likely to become a target compared to firms without such covenants. Billet, Jiang, and Lie
(2010) suggest that bondholder wealth expropriation has declined over time with an increased use
of change-in-control covenants. See also Baran and King (2010) for additional evidence on bond
holder returns in leverage buyout transactions.
Ippolito and James (1992) propose that LBOs could extract wealth from other stakeholders as
well. They examine the termination of pension plans in 169 buyouts in the 1980s. They find that the
incidence of pension terminations doubles following LBO announcements. However, many of these
terminations are affiliated with plant closings or an adaption to terms offered by the competitors
of the LBO firm.
Brown, Fee, and Thomas (2009) examine the effect of leveraged buyouts on the firms’ suppliers,
using a sample of 157 suppliers of firms undertaking LBOs in 1981-2001. They document an average
announcement CAR of –1.3% for the suppliers. Moreover, the negative returns are concentrated
to suppliers with substantial relation-specific investments. Thus, some of the LBO gains may
come from the financial leverage as a commitment device in negotiations with suppliers and other
stakeholders.
Another group of stake holders in the buyout transaction is the LBO bank lenders. Kracaw
and Zenner (1996) examine wealth effects of highly leveraged transactions on the stock prices of
lead-banks of the leveraged-loan syndicate. They find significantly positive average CARs of 0.5%
when the transaction is announced and another 0.4% when the bank financing is agreed upon.
Moreover, the bank stock returns are increasing in the size of the highly leveraged transaction. In
all, bank lenders are expected to make profits on financing highly leveraged transactions and not
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the opposite.
Demiroglu and James (2010) investigate how the financial structure of a leveraged buyout is
related to the reputation of the private equity sponsor. They examine a sample of 180 public-to-
private LBOs completed in 1997–2007. Demiroglu and James (2010) find that portfolio companies of
high-reputation sponsors pay lower bank and institutional loan spreads, have longer loan maturities,
and rely more on institutional loans. In addition, sponsor reputation is positively related to the
amount of leverage (debt/EBITDA) used to finance the buyout, but not to the pricing multiple.
Also, reputable sponsors are more active when credit spreads are low and bank lending standards
are relatively lax, suggesting that reputable sponsors are able to exploit favorable credit market
conditions for LBOs.
Ivashina and Kovner (2009) further study the impact on the loan terms of LBO sponsors’
repeated lending from banks. The sample is 1,590 leveraged loans financing private equity sponsored
LBOs between 1993 and 2005. Ivashina and Kovner (2009) show that loan spreads decrease and
maximum debt-to-EBITDA covenants increase in the sponsor’s lending relationship with the bank
and the potential for future fee business. It is possible that the advantage from lending relationships
could help explain the persistence in returns across LBO sponsors documented by Kaplan and
Schoar (2005). See also Cao and Liu (2012) for an analysis of shared bank relationships between
the private equity sponsor and the target firm. Overall, these results suggest that LBO firms play
an important role as financial intermediaries, helping their portfolio companies achieve leverage on
better terms than as standalone borrowers.
8.4.5 Wealth transfers from target shareholders
Muller and Panunzi (2004) argue that the LBO sponsor can expropriate minority shareholders by
merging the firm with the raider’s leveraged acquisition subsidiary. Also, while managers have a
fiduciary duty to negotiate fair value in a buyout transaction, as acquirers of shares, they stand
to gain from a low transaction value. Thus, by understating the true value of the target shares,
they could expropriate wealth from outside target shareholders in the buyout. The evidence on the
extent to which managers are able to manipulate the target firm’s books and thus indirectly the offer
price is inconclusive. DeAngelo (1986) examines the accounting choices of 64 NYSE firms proposing
an MBO during 1973–1982. Using a variety of tests, she fails to find any evidence that managers
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systematically understate earnings in the period leading up to the buyout. Perry and Williams
(1994) employ a different methodology and a larger sample of 175 MBOs. In contrast, they find
evidence of manipulation of discretionary accruals that lowers the earnings in the year preceding
the buyout announcement. Similarly, Li, Qian, and Zhu (2012) find that target firms exhibit
abnormally high discretionary sales, general and administration (SGA) expenses and abnormally
low discretionary accruals, and losses from asset sales in the year prior to an MBO announcement,
allowing managers to acquire the target firm relatively cheap. Further, Hafzalla (2009) document
that managers involved in MBOs, issue press releases with more negative news just prior to the
MBO transaction.
Kaplan (1989b) compares the financial forecasts that firms present at the time of a management
buyout to subsequent performance. He finds that the actual post-buyout performance generally lags
the forecast, rejecting the notion that managers capitalize on inside information in the MBO. Lee
(1992) studies a sample of withdrawn MBO proposals to determine whether managers’ proposals
reveal information beyond the gains from the completed transaction. He finds that stock prices drop
back to their pre-bid level after the withdrawal of the MBO proposal unless another bidder appears.
He suggests that the wealth creation in LBOs primarily results from efficiency gains associated with
the completed transaction rather than wealth transfers from pre-buyout shareholders. Moreover,
Ofek (1994) finds that stock prices drop back to their pre-buyout level after MBO offers are canceled
or rejected by the target boards. Also, there is no subsequent improvement in the operating
performance of these firms. Overall, the evidence at large suggests that buyout gains come from
other sources than expropriation of selling shareholders
A relatively recent practice is the so called “club deals”, where two or more private equity
firms jointly sponsor an LBO. The equity portion in the 2006–2007 mega-deals may have been
too large for a single fund to finance on its own. Indeed, Wu (2011) shows that the likelihood for
private equity syndication increases with investment size and geographic distance. Stanfield (2011)
finds that buyout funds with a history of poor deal performance are more likely to participate in
syndicates than funds with a record of past success. A concern with these club deals, however,
is that LBO sponsors may collude to limit competition, hence reducing the price paid to target
shareholders. Addressing this concern, the U.S. Department of Justice launched an inquiry in late
2006 into the effect of private equity consortiums on takeover competition.
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Officer, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2011) examine the collusion argument for a sample of 70 club deals
and 131 single-sponsor LBOs completed between 1984 and 2007. Using target abnormal return
estimates, they find that club deals are associated with significantly lower premiums than single-
sponsor deals. Guo, Hotchkiss, and Song (2011) report that club deals are associated with higher
returns on the capital invested in the LBO. However, target shareholder returns are also higher
in club deals, rejecting the proposal of lower prices. Moreover, LBO fund returns are not related
to measures of the competition in the bidding, suggesting that deals with better ex-ante prospects
attract participation by private equity consortiums. Boone and Mulherin (2011) studies 70 club
deals and 94 single-sponsor deals over 2003–2007. Based on SEC filings, they show that the level
of takeover competition is significantly higher for both types of LBO bidders compared to a control
sample of takeovers. Moreover, for a longer window that better account for differences in the
takeover process, they document target abnormal returns of similar magnitude across the different
bidder categories. In sum, there is little evidence that club deals limit bidder competition in LBOs
at the expense of target shareholders.22
Outside investors may play an active role in the buyout, promoting target shareholder interests.
Peck (1996) examines block trades in 111 MBO bids between 1984 and 1987. She finds that
acquisitions of equity blocks increase around MBO offers, peaking three months prior to the offer.
The participation of these blockholders increases the probability that the MBO proposal fails and
a rival bidder acquires the firm. For a sample of 196 LBOs in 1990–2006, Huang (2010) finds
significant increases in hedge fund holdings prior to the bid. He shows that the buyout premium is
increasing in the level of hedge fund ownership in the target firm, in particular for hedge funds with
an activism agenda. Thus, outside investors seem to play an important role in enhancing target
returns.
For a sample of 186 LBOs in 2000-2006, Acharya and Johnson (2010) examine insider trades
prior to the buyout announcement. They show that the likelihood of insider trading in stock and
options markets increases with the number of participants in the equity syndicate. Similarly, insider
trading in bond markets and credit default swaps increases in the size of the debt syndicate. This
22See Marquez and Singh (2009) for a theoretical analysis of club formation and Meuleman, Wright, Manigart,
and Lockett (2009) for evidence on club deals in the United Kingdom. Povel and Singh (2010) model how “stapled
finance” (a loan committed arranged by the seller) helps increase bidding competition among private equity bidders
in auctions.
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suggests that insider trading is more likely the more people has advance knowledge of the buyout.
Recent evidence indicates that board members and their personal social networks influence
what companies become targets in private equity transactions, which have huge value implications
for target shareholders. Stuart and Yim (2010) analyze how directors’ prior deal exposure through
other board assignments affect the likelihood that a firm is targeted in a leveraged buyout trans-
action. The sample consists of all U.S. publicly traded firms in 2000–2007, of which 473 received
a buyout offer. Stuart and Yim (2010) find that firms are 40% more likely to get a takeover offer
from a buyout fund if they have one or more directors with prior experience of private equity deals
through interlocking directorships. The higher takeover propensity is concentrated to firms where
these directors have positive going-private experience and are influential on the current board. See
also Becker and Pollet (2008), Weir, Wright, and Scholes (2008), Bharath and Dittmar (2010) and
Mehran and Peristiani (2010) for evidence on firms’ decision to go private through a leveraged
buyout transaction.
Target shareholders can realize a gain only if the deal is consummated. Cain, Davidoff, and
Macias (2011) study the contract terms in 227 buyouts between 2004 and 2010, 32 of which failed
for a variety of reasons. Beginning in August 2007, 12 private equity firms strategically defaulted
on pending acquisitions of public targets that had declined in value since the contracting date.
Two contract terms predict bidder default during the financial crises: (1) the $ amount of reverse
termination fee paid to the target in case of non-performance (i.e. failure to close the deal);
and (2) the ability of the target to seek court enforcement of the buyout agreement, so called
“specific performance”. Cain, Davidoff, and Macias (2011) conduct a detailed study of the 12
terminated deals and document that none of them were driven by lack of credit financing to complete
the transaction. They further show that average reverse termination fees have doubled in size
post-crisis, and are even greater for sponsors with previous non-performance and in transactions
representing a larger fraction of sponsor equity. At the same time, targets are less likely to seek
third-party enforcement of the buyout contract and are generally of a smaller dollar size than before
the crisis. Thus, private equity sponsors and target firms appear to have changed multiple contract
terms post-crises to shift the allocation of deal risk.
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8.4.6 Taxes
Interest expenses are deductible and therefore reduce the firm’s cost of capital. In the 1980s, man-
agement could also chose to step up the value of the assets after the buyout, increasing depreciation
deductions. Kaplan (1989b) estimates the value of potential tax benefits created in MBOs using a
range of assumptions about the marginal tax advantage to debt and the debt retirement schedule.
Depending on the assumptions, the median value of the tax benefits from interest deductions range
from 13% to 130% of the premium paid to pre-buyout shareholders, or 5% to 53% of the market
value of equity two months prior to the buyout. He finds a strong positive correlation between the
total tax deductions and the premium, and suggests that taxes are an important source of gains in
leveraged buyouts.
Jenkinson and Stucke (2011) estimate the size of debt tax benefits for the 100 largest U.S.
buyouts in 2003-2008. They report that the size of the takeover premia is strongly correlated to
the incremental tax savings in the deal. On average, the takeover premium is around twice the
size of estimates of the capitalized tax savings. Thus, it appears that anticipated tax savings from
increased financial leverage essentially are captured by selling shareholders rather than the private
equity investors. See also Schipper and Smith (1991) and Newbould, Chatfield, and Anderson
(1992) for further analysis of tax deductions in leveraged buyouts. Jensen, Kaplan, and Stiglin
(1989) estimate that leveraged buyouts have a positive overall effect on the tax revenue of the U.S.
Treasury. Simulations of the net effect of leveraged buyout activity for the U.S. Treasury are found
in Chatfield and Newbould (1996).
8.5 Industry effects
Slovin, Sushka, and Bendeck (1991) propose that leveraged buyout announcements convey private
information about the future prospects of the industry. Examining the stock price reaction of
940 industry rivals of 128 buyouts in the 1980s, they find a significant and positive rival average
announcement CAR of 1.3%. The returns tend to be greater for rivals that are smaller in size
than the target firm. Phallipou and Gottschalg (2008) argue that LBO announcements signal
the existence of an industry-wide agency problem, encouraging industry rivals to improve their
governance structure too. They document an increase in rival firm options awards, director share
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ownership, and CEO turnover following LBO activity. It is not clear, however, whether their
results are specific to rivals in industries with LBO activity or reflect a general trend in corporate
governance.
One of the potential costs of high leverage is that it reduces financial flexibility and makes
the LBO firm vulnerable to price competition by rival firms. Chevalier (1995b) examines how a
leveraged buyout affects the pricing behavior of the LBO firm and its rivals in a local market, using
data from the supermarket industry. She shows that prices rise when rival firms are also highly
leveraged and LBO firms have higher prices than their competitors. However, prices fall when rival
firms have relatively low debt-levels and a single competitor controls a large market share. She
finds that these low prices increase the probability that the LBO firm will exit, and suggests that
rivals attempt to prey on LBO chains.
Phillips (1995) examine how financial leverage interacts with product market decisions for four
different industries where a major player initiated a leveraged buyout. In three of the industries,
characterized by difficult entry and high leverage of rival firms, prices increase and industry output
declines with the average industry debt ratio. In the fourth industry, characterized by low leverage
of rivals and low barriers to entry, prices fall and industry output increases with the industry debt
ratio.
Berstein, Lerner, Sorensen, and Stromberg (2010) examine aggregate effects of private equity
investments across 20 industries in 26 OECD countries between 1991 and 1997. They find that
leveraged buyout activity is associated with faster industry growth in productivity and employment.
Yet, there is little evidence that economic fluctuations in industries are exacerbated by the presence
of private equity investments.
Overall, the evidence indicates that firms’ leverage decisions affect industry pricing and output.
See also Dasgupta and Titman (1998) for an equilibrium model explaining the interaction between
capital structure and product markets, Fulghieri and Nagarajan (1996) for a model on the strategic
role of high leverage for deterring entry in monopolistic markets, and Chevalier (1995a) for further
evidence. Also, Parsons and Titman (2008) discuss empirical studies on the interactions between
leverage and corporate strategy.
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8.6 Organizational longevity and exit
Are leveraged buyouts a transitory structure or a sustainable corporate form that lasts over a longer
period of time? Jensen (1989) argues that the organizational form of a leveraged buyout is superior
to public ownership for firms in low-growth industries, predicting long-lived LBO companies. In
contrast, Rappaport (1990) claims that the lack of financial flexibility will ultimately harm the
buyout firm and foresees a prompt return to the public equity markets. Kaplan (1991) examines
183 large leveraged buyouts completed between 1979 and 1986. He finds that the median LBO
target remains in private ownership for seven years. Moreover, 45% of the LBO firms return to
public ownership at some point. In a sample of 72 reverse LBOs, i.e. LBOs that subsequently went
public, Muscarella and Versuypens (1990) report that the average firm remains private for three
years.
Halpern, Kieschnick, and Rotenberg (1999) conjecture that there are two types of targets in
leveraged buyouts. One is the classical public target with little managerial equity and high free cash
flow. The other is a target that performs poorly because the manager has too much of her wealth
invested in the firm and hence is suboptimally risk-averse. Examining 126 LBOs in 1981–1986, they
find that their sample clusters into two groups. The first group has low prior managerial equity
and takeover premiums decrease in managerial equity. Moreover, the buyout is led by an outside
sponsor and the LBO firm is typically sold in an IPO or to a strategic buyer. The second group has
high managerial equity and takeover premiums that increase in managerial equity. These buyouts
are led by managers and the LBO firm tends to remain private. In addition, managers in this group
typically increase their ownership fraction but decrease the dollar investment in the LBO firm. The
authors suggest that a partition into these two different types of target firms better describes the
LBO population.
Stromberg (2008) studies holding periods and exits for 21,000 buyout transactions in 1970–
2007. 17,000 (80%) of these buyouts were backed by a financial sponsor. Given the large number
of transactions in the 2000s, only 40% of the firms in his sample have exited. He finds that 39% of
the exits are in the form of a sale to a strategic buyer. One quarter of the exits are a secondary
buyout, i.e. a sale to another LBO fund—an exit form which has increased in importance over the
last decade. IPOs account for 13% of the exits. Moreover, despite the significant leverage used in
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buyouts, only 6% of exiting firms file for bankruptcy or initiate a financial restructuring. Stromberg
(2008) further shows that the median firm stays in LBO ownership for nine years, and only 8% of
the firms are sold within two years of the buyout. Overall, the evidence suggests that leveraged
buyouts are a long-term organizational form for many firms.
Harford and Kolasinski (2011) examine 788 large U.S. LBO transactions in 1993–2001, tracking
exit status through 2009. Similar to Stromberg (2008), 10% of the portfolio companies exit through
an IPO, 36% through a sale to a strategic buyer, 30% through a sale to a financial buyer and 15%
end up in financial distress. Interestingly, when a sponsor sells a portfolio company to a public
strategic acquirer, the buyer’s stock price reaction is positive. Also, a purchase from another
financial sponsor cannot help predict the subsequent type of exit. Instead, secondary buyouts are
common when the sponsor has held the portfolio company longer, suggesting that this type of exit
is a result of the pressure to sell rather than firm-specific characteristics.
Wang (2011) studies a sample of 485 U.K. secondary buyouts in 1997–2008. Supporting the
conjecture of Harford and Kolasinski (2011), she finds that the likelihood of a secondary buyout
exit is higher when the debt markets offer favorable conditions, when industry IPO volume is low,
and when the selling private equity firm wants to raise a new fund. While secondary buyouts have
a higher average price multiple than first-time buyouts, this could be explained by the favorable
debt market conditions at the time of the transaction. Bonini (2012) fails to find any evidence of
operating performance improvements in secondary buyouts and documents lower returns to private
equity investors. See also Achleitner and Figge (2011) for evidence on secondary buyouts.
Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) study the decision to exit a buyout through a public offering for
62 reverse LBOs in the 1980s. They find that the IPO coincides with a peak in the buyout firm’s
operating performance. The stock of the reverse LBOs outperform comparison firms, however,
suggesting that the market anticipates the subsequent decline in operating profitability. They
conclude that LBO firms chose to go public when their performance is strong. Holthausen and
Larcker (1996) further show that the accounting performance of LBO firms exceeds that of its
industry rivals at the time of the IPO and for the following four years. Chou, Gombola, and Liu
(2006) document increases in discretionary accruals prior to the listings, and suggest that earnings
management may explain a subsequent decline in profitability.
For a sample of 594 reverse LBOs from 1981 to 2006, Cao (2011) find that LBO duration is
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negatively related to favorable IPO market conditions. Moreover, firms with shorter LBO duration
experience greater deterioration of performance and higher probability of bankruptcy following
the IPO. Cao (2011) suggests that sponsors may seek quick cash returns from selling immature
LBOs when stockmarket conditions are favorable. Nevertheless, Cao and Lerner (2009) show that
the three- and five-year stock performance of reverse LBOs does not significantly differ from the
market. See Levis (2011) for further evidence on the performance of reverse LBOs in the UK and
Van de Gucht and Moore (1998) for estimates of the probability that an LBO firm returns to public
ownership.
Tykvova and Borell (2011) examine the extent to which buyout companies become financially
distressed and go bankrupt. Their sample is 1,842 European buyouts in 2000-2008 and matched
control firms. Importantly, private equity backed companies have no higher bankruptcy filing rates
than do the non-buyout companies. In fact, when the private equity sponsor is “experienced”—
i.e. has carried out a buyout transaction before—the probability of bankruptcy filing is even
lower. Wilson and Wrigth (2011) confirm the result that private-equity backed firms have no
different failure rates in a large sample of U.K. firms over the period 1995–2010. See also Halpern,
Kieschnick, and Rotenberg (2009) for further evidence on the determinants of financial distress and
bankruptcy in the cross-section of highly levered transactions.
Hotchkiss, Smith, and Stromberg (2011) study 2,156 U.S. firms that obtained leverage loan
financing between 1997 and 2010, 991 of which were private-equity backed at some point during
the sample period. Similar to the evidence from Europe, they find that the likelihood of default is
no higher for buyout firms than other firms when controlling for leverage. However, conditional on
default, the portfolio companies are restructured in a shorter time and are more likely to emerge as
an independent company versus being sold or liquidated. This is particularly the case for the firms
owned by private equity funds that are older and larger, and with more cash. Overall, it appears
that buyout sponsors help facilitate efficient restructurings once a portfolio company defaults.
9 Conclusions
In this survey, we review the extant literature on corporate breakup transactions and highly lever-
aged transactions such as LBOs. For each individual transaction, we survey techniques, transaction
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volume, valuation effects and potential sources of restructuring gains. Corporate breakup transac-
tions are optimal when the separation of the diversified firm’s divisions increases firm value. The
breakup transactions range from divestitures and spinoffs, which entirely separates a subsidiary from
its parent, to equity carveouts and tracking stock, which preserves some parent control. LBOs and
other highly leveraged recapitalizations result in the firm taking on substantial additional debt in
its capital structure.
A divestiture is a sale of a division or subsidiary in a private transaction. Asset sales generate
cash to the parent firm on the one hand, but trigger a capital gains tax on the other. The average
parent firm experiences an abnormal stock return of 1.2% and the average buyer a CAR of 1.2%
when a divestiture is announced. These valuation effects have several explanations: (1) Most
divestitures involve divisions that are unrelated to the parent firm, increasing the corporate focus of
the diversified firm. (2) The parent firm’s investment decisions tend to improve after the divestiture.
(3) Assets are often transferred to a higher valuation buyer. (4) It appears that managers are
reluctant to sell assets, managers in firms with better corporate governance make better divestment
decisions, and the retention of proceeds is associated with inefficient investments.
A spinoff is the separation of a subsidiary through a distribution of the stock to parent share-
holders. Spinoffs can be completed without any tax implications, but also do not generate any
cash to the parent. The parent stock price increases by 3.3% on average at the announcement of
a spinoff. The value creation comes from (1) increased corporate focus; (2) elimination of cross-
subsidization leading to improved investment decisions; (3) reduced information asymmetries; and
(4) a higher probability of becoming a target. Investors rebalance their portfolios when the parent
and subsidiary stocks start trading separately. Moreover, parent managers design the subsidiary
corporate charter to include more takeover defenses compared to the parent firm itself as well as
other IPO firms.
An equity carveout is a partial IPO of the subsidiary, where the parent typically retains a
controlling stake. It generates cash (the IPO proceeds) but no tax. The average parent firm
experiences an abnormal stock return of 1.8% at the announcement of an equity carveout. The
gains in equity carveouts are attributed to (1) an increase in corporate focus, and (2) a reduction of
the financing costs for high-growth subsidiaries. Equity carveouts are a temporary organizational
form, and most carveouts are subsequently reacquired or sold off. It is possible that the carveout
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generates information about the value of the subsidiary as an independent company, improving the
decision to exercise the option to sell out or buy back the subsidiary.
Tracking stock is a separate class of common stock in the parent company, tracking the perfor-
mance of a given division. The tracking stock generates cash if it is offered to the public and has no
tax implication. The average parent CAR is 3.0% on the announcement of a tracking stock issue.
These announcement returns are, however, difficult to explain beyond an initial market infatuation
with yet another breakup transaction. The tracking stock is a ”quasi-pure” play in that it requires
separate divisional SEC filings, but has voting rights in the parent. In fact, tracking stock trades
like its corporate sibling divisions rather than its industry. It lends itself for expropriation since
the corporate board, without legal remedy, can transfer funds from the tracked division to the rest
of the company. As a result of such expropriation, most tracking stock issues have been dissolved.
A leveraged recapitalization is a large special dividend financed by debt, substantially increasing
the firm’s leverage. The average abnormal stock return is 5% on the announcement of a leveraged
recapitalization and 20 to 30% through closing of the transaction. The gains in leveraged recap-
italizations are attributed primarily to the incentive effects of debt: recap firms substantially cut
their capital expenditures and increase operating profitability.
A leveraged buyout is an acquisition by private investors financed primarily by debt. Premiums
paid to target shareholders in LBOs average 37%, and announcement CARs average 16–17%. The
LBO gains are attributed to several sources: (1) improved investment and operating efficiencies; (2)
increased equity-based incentives to management; and (3) strong monitoring by the LBO sponsor.
Buyouts after the turn of the century appear to have somewhat less improvements in operating
efficiency, but in general create value similar to LBOs of the 1980s. Recent developments include
club deals (consortiums of LBO sponsors bidding together), fund-to-fund exits (LBO funds selling
the portfolio firm to another LBO fund in a secondary buyout), a leveraged loan market that is
highly liquid, and evidence of persistence in fund returns (perhaps because brand-sponsors borrow
at better rates).
In this survey, we have primarily focused on the individual transactions and their associated
empirical evidence. This is also how most of the literature progresses. A major drawback of
this approach is the resulting lack of analysis of alternatives. That is, when a company self-
selects a divestiture, what were reasonable alternative strategies? In what sense was divestiture
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superior to, say, a spinoff or an equity carveout? In what sense was going private via an LBO
superior to a leveraged recapitalization, where the firm levers up without a change of control?
Are there systematic differences between public to private LBO transactions and private-to-private
restructurings?
Ideally, one would use a theoretical model to structure the answers to these types of questions.
The perhaps greatest challenge to the restructuring literature is to achieve a modicum of integration
of the analysis across transaction types. Also, it is difficult to evaluate the expected return from
buyout investments with only limited data on portfolio companies that do not return to public
status within the sample period. We expect these issues to be resolved as both theories and data
become more readily available in the future.
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Figure 1
Annual volume of U.S. divestitures, 1970-2011 (source: Mergerstat Review)
A: Total transaction value in $ billion and number of divestitures
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Figure 2
Annual volume of spinoffs and carveouts worldwide, 1985-2012 (source: SDC)
A: Total transaction value in $ billion and number of spinoff announcements
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B: Total transaction value in $ billion and number of equity carveout announcements
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Figure 3
Annual worldwide volume of leveraged buyouts (source: SDC), 1985-2012
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Figure 4
Leveraged bank loans issuance volume (source: S&P’s LCD)
A: U.S. sponsored leveraged loans issuance volume in $ billion, 1997-2012
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B: U.S. and Europe leveraged loans issuance volume in $ billion, 2006-2012
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Figure 5
U.S. leveraged loans new-issue spreads, 4q 1998-2q 2012 (source: S&P’s LCD)
Average new-issue BB/BB- spreads above LIBOR for pro-rata and institutional tranches
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Figure 6
High yield debt issuance volume (source: S&P’s LCD)
A: U.S. high yield debt issuance volume in $ billion, 1995-2012
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B: U.S. and Europe high yield debt issuance volume in $ billion, 2006-2012
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Figure 7
Issuance of 2nd lien loans and transaction debt multiples (source: S&P’s LCD)
A: U.S. sponsored issuance volume of 2nd lien loans in $ billion, 1999-2q 2012
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Figure 8
European issuance of mezzanine debt, high yield debt, and leveraged loans,
2006-2012
New issuance volume in EUR billion. The sources are European Mezzanine Review and S&P’s LCD.
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Figure 9
Capital raised for private equity (source: Preqin)
Total capital in $ billion raised globally in private equity funds with final close 1997-2q 2012
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Figure 10
Average annual percent equity contribution and purchase multiples in LBOs
A: Average equity contribution to LBOs in percent of the capital structure, 1987-2q 2012.
Source: Portfolio Management Data
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Table 1
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for divestiture announcement of 7,544 sellers
and 2,300 buyers in 25 selected studies, 1963–2005
Relative size is the average ratio of the sales price of the divested assets to the pre-deal total assets (TA) and market
value of equity (MVE) of the seller and buyer, respectively.
Study CAR Relative size Sample Time Event
Mean Median TA MVE size period window
Panel A: Seller returns:
Alexander, Benson, and Kampmeyer (1984) 0.3% 53 1964–1973 [-1,0]
Linn and Rozeff (1984) 1.6 % 77 [-1,0]
Rosenfeld (1984) 2.3% 62 1969–1981 [-1,0]
Jain (1985) 0.5% 1,062 1976–1978 [-1,0]
Klein (1986) 1.1% 202 1970–1979 [-2,0]
Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987) 1.5% 16% 114 1963–1981 [-1,0]
Hirschey and Zaima (1989) 1.6% 170 1975–1982 [-1,0]
Hirschey, Slovin, and Zaima (1990) 1.5% 38% 75 1975–1982 [-1,0]
Afshar, Taﬄer, and Sudarsanam (1992) 0.7% 10% 178 1985–1986 [-1,0]
Sicherman and Pettway (1992) 0.9% 30% 278 1980–1987 [-1,0]
John and Ofek (1995) 1.5% 0.8% 39% 258 1986–1988 [-2,0]
Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) 1.4% 0.7% 11% 69% 93 1984–1989 [-1,0]
Loh, Bezjak, and Toms (1995) 1.5% 59 1980–1987 [-1,0]
Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro (1995) 1.7% 0.7% 33% 17% 179 1980–1991 [0,1]
Hanson and Song (2000) 0.6% 0.3% 27% 326 1981–1995 [-1,1]
Mulherin and Boone (2000) 2.6% 1.6% 18% 139 1990–1999 [-1,1]
Clubb and Stouraitis (2002) 1.1% 0.5% 14% 187 1984–1994 [-1,0]
Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) 3.4% 31% 188 1983–1994 [-1,1]
Kiymaz (2006) 3.2% 9% 205 1989–2002 [-1,1]
Benou, Madua, and Ngo (2008) 0.9% 1,812 1981–2001 [-1,1]
Cao, Owen, and Yawson (2008) 1.3% 668 1992–2003 [-1,1]
Francoeur and Niyubahwe (2009) 0.6% 167 1990–2000 [-1,1]
Ataullah, Davidson, and Le (2010) 2.0% 14% 195 1992–2005 [-1,1]
Owen, Shi, and Yawson (2010) 1.6% 0.6% 20% 797 1997–2005 [-1,1]
Sample-size weighted seller average 1.2% 20% 27% 7,544 1963–2005
Panel B: Buyer returns:
Jain (1985) 0.5% 304 1976–1978 [-1,0]
Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987) 0.6% 19% 105 1963–1981 [-1,0]
Sicherman and Pettway (1992) 0.5% 278 1980–1987 [-1,0]
Datta and Iskandar-Datta (1995) 0.0% 13% 63 1982–1990 [-1,0]
John and Ofek (1995) 0.4% -0.5% 72% 167 1986–1988 [-2,0]
Hanson and Song (2000) 0.5% 0.2% 326 1981–1995 [-1,1]
Kiymaz (2006) 0.8% 185 1989–2002 [-1,1]
Benou, Madua, and Ngo (2008) 2.3% 872 1981–2001 [-1,1]
Sample-size weighted buyer average 1.2% 19% 25% 2,300 1963–2002
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Table 2
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for 2,957 spinoffs in 24 selected studies,
1962–2007
Relative size is the ratio of the market value of equity of the spunoff subsidiary and the parent company prior to the
spinoff.
Study CAR Relative size Sample Time Event
Mean Median Mean Median size period window
Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) 3.3% 10% 55 1963–1980 [0,1]
Hite and Owers (1983) 3.3% 7% 123 1963–1981 [-1,0]
Schipper and Smith (1983) 2.8% 20% 93 1963–1981 [-1,0]
Rosenfeld (1984) 5.6% 35 1969–1981 [-1,0]
Vijh (1994) 2.9% 2.1% 29% 18% 113 1964–1990 [-1,0]
Allen, Lummer, McConnell, and Reed (1995) 2.1% 94 1962–1991 [-1,0]
Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro (1995) 1.3% 1.6% 33% 24% 37 1980–1991 [0,1]
Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar (1997) 3.4% 1.4% 85 1975–1991 [-1,0]
Best, Best, and Agapos (1998) 3.4% 72 1979–1993 [-1,0]
Desai and Jain (1999) 3.8% 29% 18% 144 1975–1991 [-1,1]
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) 3.1% 1.9% 31% 14% 118 1979–1993 [-1,0]
Mulherin and Boone (2000) 4.5% 3.6% 22% 14% 106 1990–1999 [-1,1]
Gertner, Powers, and Scharstein (2002) 3.9% 2.2% 24% 19% 160 1982–1996 [-1,0]
Wruck and Wruck (2002) 3.6% 172 1985–1995 [-1,0]
Burch and Nanda (2003) 3.7% 3.2% 24% 20% 106 1979–1996 [-2,1]
Maxwell and Rao (2003) 3.6% 2.6% 25% 19% 80 1976–1997 [-1,0]
Seoungpil and Denis (2004) 4.0% 3.1% 25% 17% 150 1981–1988 [-1,1]
Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) 1.7% 0.6% 156 1987–2000 [-1,0]
McNeil and Moore (2005) 3.5% 25% 23% 153 1980–1996 [-1,1]
Qian and Sudarsanam (2007) 4.8% 2.6% 157 1987–2005 [-1,1]
Veld and Veld-Merkulova (2008) 3.1% 2.6% 21% 91 1995–2002 [-1,1]
Chemmanur, Jordan, Liu, and Wu (2010) 2.2% 139 1990–2000 [-1,1]
Harris and Madura (2011) 2.5% 1.9% 472 1984–2007 [-1,1]
Jain, Kini, and Shenoy (2011) 4.9% 46 1986–2005 [-1,1]
Sample-size weighted average 3.3% 26% 18% 2,957 1962–2007
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Table 3
Cumulative abnormal returns for 1,251 equity carveout announcements in 10
selected studies, 1965–2007
CAR is the parent cumulative abnormal stock return over the event window relative to the announcement of the
equity carveout. Relative size is the ratio of the market value of equity of the carved out subsidiary and its parent
company.
Study CAR Relative size Sample Time Event
Mean Median Mean Median size period window
Schipper and Smith (1986) 1.8% 8% 76 1965–1983 [-4,0]
Klein, Rosenfeld, and Beranek (1991) 2.7% 52 1966–1983 [-4,0]
Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro (1995) 1.2% 1.5% 45% 31% 32 1980–1991 [0,1]
Allen and McConnell (1998) 2.1% 20% 14% 186 1978–1993 [-1,1]
Vijh (1999, 2002) 1.9% 18% 336 1980–1997 [-1,1]
Mulherin and Boone (2000) 2.3% 0.8% 37% 17% 125 1990–1999 [-1,1]
Hulburt (2003) 1.6% 1.1% 30% 172 1981–1994 [-1,0]
Wagner (2004) 1.7% 32% 22% 71 1984–2002 [-1,1]
Jain, Kini, and Shenoy (2011) 1.6% 65 1986–2005 [-1,1]
Sun and Shu (2011) 0.5% 136 1994–2007 [-1,1]
Sample-size weighted average 1.8% 33% 1,251 1965–2007
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Table 4
Premiums paid in 1,058 leverage buyouts for 7 selected studies from 1973–2006
The premium is the ratio between the final offer price and the pre-buyout stock price less one.
Study Premium Type of Sample Time Day of pre-buyout
Mean Median deal size period stock price
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice (1984) 59% LBO 23 1973–1980 -40
Lehn and Poulsen (1989) 36% LBO 257 1980–1987 -20
Kaplan (1989c) 46% 42% MBO 76 1980–1985 -40
Harlow and Howe (1993) 45% LBO 121 1980–1989 -20
Renneboog, Simons, and Wright (2007) 40% 38% LBO 177 1997–2003 -40
Billet, Jiang, and Lie (2010) 27% 27% LBO 212 1990–2006 -60
Guo, Hotchkiss, and Song (2011) 29% LBO 192 1996–2006 -20
Sample-size weighted average 37% 32% 1,058 1973–2006
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